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Abstract
This paper examines to what extent marital sorting affects cross-sectional
earnings inequality in Germany over the past three decades, while explicitly
taking into account labor supply choices. Using rich micro data, the observed
distribution of couples’ earnings is compared to a counterfactual of randomly
matched spouses. Hypothetical earnings are predicted based on a structural
model of household labor supply. For West Germany, a positive effect of
marital sorting on inequality is found after adjusting for labor supply behavior,
while the effect is limited when earnings are taken as given. This means that
there is positive sorting in earnings potential which is veiled by relatively low
female labor force participation. In East Germany, the impact of marital
sorting on inequality is highly disequalizing irrespective of adjusting for labor
supply choices. This is mainly due to the fact that East German women are
much more attached to the labor market.
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1 Introduction
Positive marital sorting may contribute to inequality across couple households by
reducing the potential for income equalization within families. The observation of
increasing correlation of spouses’ earnings is typically interpreted as an indication
of couples becoming more similar in terms of earnings-related characteristics such as
ability or education (Mare, 1991). Assortative mating is considered as an important
driver of growing inequality in many societies (Lam, 1997).1 However, positive
correlation in earnings is not only determined by “who lives with whom” (Jenkins
and Micklewright, 2007), but is also related to secular trends in female labor force
participation, which have been found to play a differential role across the income
distribution (Bredemeier and Juessen, 2013).
This paper examines to what extent marital sorting affects cross-sectional earn-
ings inequality across couple households in Germany since the 1980s while explicitly
taking into account labor supply behavior. Using rich micro data from the German
Socio-Economic Panel, the observed distribution of couples’ earnings is compared
to two different counterfactual distributions. Both rely on a hypothetical sample
of randomly matched couples. In a first step, earnings of hypothetical spouses are
taken as observed in the data in order to construct a counterfactual distribution
of couple earnings. While this is standard in the related literature (e.g., Aaberge
et al., 2005; Greenwood et al., 2014; Hryshko et al., 2014) the procedure ignores
that the amount of earnings does not only depend on earnings potential, but is also
the result of an endogenous labor supply decision. This depends on the household
context, most importantly the spouse’s characteristics. That is why, in a second
step, counterfactual labor supply choices, and hence earnings, of randomly matched
couples are predicted based on a structural model of household labor supply. Differ-
ences in earnings inequality between the distributions of observed and hypothetical
couples before and after labor supply adjustment allow to disentangle the effects of
sorting in earnings potential and the role of labor supply. The focus on Germany
allows to compare the impact of marital sorting on inequality separately for East
1 In general, changes in household context have been found to contribute to income inequality
(see, e.g., Jenkins, 1995; Daly and Valletta, 2006; Martin, 2006; Peichl et al., 2012).
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and West Germany. Due to the division until 1990 the two parts of the country
exhibit distinct differences in educational sorting, earnings correlation and female
labor force participation.
The main finding of the paper is that the impact of marital sorting on earnings
inequality across couple households depends on the choice of the counterfactual as
well as the extent of women’s attachment to the labor force. Comparing the observed
level of inequality across couples to a counterfactual of randomly matched spouses
while taking earnings as given suggests that the impact of marital sorting has been
rather limited in West Germany since the 1980s. However, taking into account
predicted labor supply choices of randomly matched couples, a pronounced dise-
qualizing effect of marital sorting on earnings inequality is found for West Germany.
In East Germany, the effect of marital sorting on inequality since the mid-1990s
is found to be disequalizing as well, which holds irrespective of adjusting for labor
supply choices.
The difference between East and West Germany is driven by two factors. First,
educational sorting as well as earnings correlation among couples are more pro-
nounced in the East than in the West. Moreover, there is a positive relationship
between labor supply of East German women and their male spouses’ position in
the earnings distribution. This relationship has changed from downward sloping
to a rather flat pattern in West Germany. Second, marital sorting in earnings po-
tential may affect overall earnings inequality across couples only if both spouses
are sufficiently attached to the labor force (Greenwood et al., 2014). While female
labor force participation has substantially increased since the mid-1980s in West
Germany, female labor supply in East Germany has traditionally been higher both
at the extensive and the intensive margin. This explains why the impact of sorting
is small when not accounting for labor supply behavior in West Germany. There is
strong sorting in earnings potential which would make the distribution across cou-
ples more unequal if West German women were substantially more attached to the
labor market – as is the case in East Germany.
There are two closely related studies on the relationship between marital sort-
ing and inequality in the U.S. taking into account labor supply. Hyslop (2001)
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looks at the interaction of individual wage inequality and family earnings inequality
within an intertemporal framework. Greenwood et al. (2014) compare family earn-
ings inequality in 1960 and 2005 and impose female labor force participation on the
aggregate level and across the two time periods as counterfactuals. The contribution
of this paper is to quantify the importance of marital sorting for cross-sectional earn-
ings inequality by predicting counterfactual earnings for randomly matched couples
within the same cross-section based on a structural model of household labor supply.
Moreover, most of the existing literature on marital sorting and inequality focuses
on U.S. data. To the best of my knowledge this is the first empirical study on the
relationship between marital sorting and earnings inequality for Germany.2
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives an overview of the previous
literature. Section 3 introduces the methodology and describes the empirical appli-
cation as well as the data. Results are presented in section 4. Section 5 concludes.
2 Background and Literature
Previous studies on the effect of an increasing association of female and male earn-
ings on inequality can largely be classified as accounting approaches. Typically, the
observed distribution of income or earnings is compared to counterfactual distri-
butions manipulating female earnings or the correlation between spouses’ earnings
while observed individual earnings are taken as given. Schwartz (2010) estimates
the contribution of the association between spouses’ earnings to growing earnings
inequality among married couples in the U.S. and finds that earnings inequality
would have been 25–30% lower than actually observed when the trend correlation
between male and female earnings in couples would have remained at its level in the
1960s (particularly at the top of the distribution). Karoly and Burtless (1995) ap-
ply decomposition techniques to examine how demographic trends in the U.S. have
affected income inequality across families and conclude that female earnings had a
key influence on family income inequality due to increasing correlation with total
2 Blossfeld and Timm (2003) study the role of the educational system in West Germany for
educational homogamy, but do not explicitly look at earnings or income inequality. Ermisch et al.
(2006) estimate the extent to which assortative mating affects intergenerational mobility.
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family income since 1980. Burtless (1999) attributes 13% of overall inequality to
the growing correlation of husbands’ and wives’ earnings. However, Cancian and
Reed (1998, 1999) conclude that female earnings were not the main driving force
towards increasing inequality and find the role of husbands’ earnings to be much
more important. Reed and Cancian (2009) find that changes in income sorting ac-
count for more than half of the increase in income inequality. They discuss several
trends that have contributed to increasing correlation of male and female earnings
in couple households, among others increases in assortative mating, the increasing
propensity to work for women married to highly educated men, and the rise in re-
turns to education. In a decomposition analysis, Eika et al. (2014) quantify the
contribution of various factors to the distribution of household income and conclude
that educational assortative mating accounts for a large part of the cross-sectional
inequality in the U.S. and Norway. Hryshko et al. (2014) examine the role of wives’
earnings for U.S. household earnings inequality and stability. Counterfactual earn-
ings are constructed by randomly rematching married men and women and using the
combined earnings. They find that coordination of spouses’ labor supply decisions
and positive assortative mating play a minor role.
Based on a decomposition of the Gini coefficient Aaberge et al. (2005) intro-
duce an index for the association of spouses’ labor incomes and find an increase
in Norway over the period 1973–1997. They compare the observed distribution
of couple earnings to a reference distribution of randomly matched couples hold-
ing individual earnings fixed. However, they emphasize that “the correct way to
derive the hypothetical [...] income distribution would consist in, first, randomly
matching the partners’ productivities, i.e. potential wages, and second, simulating
their income-producing choices, given the random match” (Aaberge et al., 2005,
p. 507). Taking into account labor supply choices is important, since earnings do
not only reflect a worker’s productivity (the wage rate) but also depend on the
number of hours worked, which is determined by the allocation of partners’ time on
paid work, household production and leisure (Juhn and Murphy, 1997; Devereux,
2004; Gottschalk and Danziger, 2005). This is related to the household context
and, therefore, changes in household characteristics are reflected in changing la-
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bor supply behavior. That is why the assessment of the effect of marital sorting
on earnings inequality should adjust for labor supply behavior in order to explicitly
distinguish two different determinants, which are observed simultaneously: First, as-
sortativeness in couple formation is related to partners matching according to their
preferences or productivities and is indicated by similar age, education or ethnicity
within couples. Second, correlation of spouses’ earnings is related to labor supply
choices given the observed match. These two related but still different determinants
should be disentangled in order to identify the socio-demographic trends of growing
inequality.
In the existing literature, the approaches to construct counterfactual earnings
or income distributions largely ignore the role of labor supply behavior, which is ex-
plicitly taken into account in this paper. One exception is Hyslop (2001), who focuses
on the interaction of individual wage inequality and family earnings inequality within
an intertemporal labor supply framework. The main finding is that U.S. wages are
correlated within families and that labor supply responds to wage changes of other
family members. While Hyslop (2001) studies the role of labor supply behavior
for family earnings inequality responding to permanent individual family members’
wage shocks, the purpose of this paper is to quantify the importance of marital sort-
ing for cross-sectional earnings inequality across couples. Another exception is the
study by Greenwood et al. (2014), which analyzes the distributions of U.S. family
earnings in 1960 and 2005 and compares the observed levels of inequality to a coun-
terfactual distribution, which would occur when matching of couples within years
was random. They find that the random matching counterfactual leaves the 1960
level of inequality virtually unchanged, while the 2005 inequality is substantially
reduced. They further examine the role of married female labor force participation
by augmenting their baseline within-year random matching of couples’ earnings by
imposing counterfactual female labor force participation rates across the two time
periods. Compared to the observed levels of inequality the levels of inequality are
almost the same for the counterfactuals of random matching and imposing swaps in
married female labor force participation. These results shed light on the importance
of female labor supply behavior for the impact of assortative mating on economic
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inequality. While Greenwood et al. (2014) use aggregate long-term changes in fe-
male labor force participation across generations as counterfactuals, the approach
in this paper is to use estimates of endogenous labor supply behavior and predict
counterfactual earnings for randomly matched couples within the same cross-section.
3 Methodology and Empirical Application
For the purpose of this analysis, the “flocking index” (Aaberge et al., 2005), which is
derived from a decomposition of the Gini coefficient, is extended. The index quan-
tifies both the extent and the sign of the effect of the association of female and male
labor earnings (“flocking together”3) on inequality across couples and is based on
the observed and a hypothetical distribution of couple earnings. The hypothetical
distribution is constructed by matching spouses’ individual earnings randomly to
each other. However, it has to be noted that a shortcoming of previous applications
of this index is that the difference between the observed and the counterfactual dis-
tribution does not reflect changes due to labor supply behavior. Hence, taking into
account labor supply coordination requires a simulation of counterfactual choices
given the randomly matched household context.
The flocking index. Consider a population of n couple households indexed i ∈
{1, . . . , n} and a distribution of household earnings Y = (y1, . . . , yn), where house-
hold i’s total earnings are the sum of both the female and the male spouse’s individ-
ual earnings: yi = yif +y
i
m. The distribution of total earnings Y is determined by the
gender-specific marginal earnings distributions, Yf and Ym, as well as the correla-
tion of spouses’ earnings, Corr [Yf , Ym], and, hence, their positions in the respective
earnings distribution. Taking Yf and Ym as given, the level of inequality in total
household earnings, represented by the Gini coefficient, G(Y ), is bounded between
an upper and a lower value: G(Y ) ∈ [Gmin(Y ), Gmax(Y )]. The bounds depend on
3 The proverb “Birdes of a feather will flocke togither” (Minsheu, 1599) might date back to
Plato’s Republic (Jowett, 1892) and means that those with similar taste tend to congregate in
groups. A modern version refers to “doctors marrying doctors rather than nurses” (OECD, 2011).
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the spouses’ earnings distributions and are defined as
G(Y) =
 G
max(Y ) if Corr [Yf , Ym] = 1
Gmin(Y ) if Corr [Yf , Ym] = −1
(1)
This means that the level of total couple earnings inequality is highest (lowest) if
the highest earning woman forms a couple with the highest (lowest) earning man,
the second highest earning woman with the second highest (lowest) man and so
on. Hence, the pattern of marital sorting with respect to earnings has the most
(dis)equalizing effect on earnings inequality across couple households in a situation
where sorting in earnings is perfectly negative (positive).
A way to assess to what extent the observed inequality in the distribution
of couple earnings is affected by non-random sorting in earnings is to compare the
observed distribution with a hypothetical one where spouses’ earnings are randomly
matched to each other. Consider a counterfactual distribution of randomly matched
couples indexed i˜ ∈ {1, . . . , n}, where i˜ is achieved by a permutation of i. A ran-
domly matched couple i˜’s total earnings are yi˜ = yi˜f + y
i˜
m. Note that, without any
further adjustments, the inequality in the gender-specific marginal distributions re-
main unchanged, i.e., G(Y˜s) = G(Ys) for s ∈ {f,m}. However, inequality of total
earnings Y˜ is affected, since the random matching of couples changes the correlation
of spouses’ earnings. This implies that in general G(Y˜ ) 6= G(Y ). Normalizing the
difference between the observed and the hypothetical Gini coefficients by the dis-
tance between the hypothetical Gini and the upper and lower bounds respectively
yields an index of the extent of “flocking together” (Aaberge et al., 2005):
V (Y, Y˜ ) =

G(Y )−G(Y˜ )
Gmax(Y )−G(Y˜ ) if G(Y ) ≥ G(Y˜ ),
G(Y )−G(Y˜ )
G(Y˜ )−Gmin(Y ) if G(Y ) < G(Y˜ ),
(2)
where V ∈ [−1, 1]. Positive values of V imply that G(Y ) > G(Y˜ ), i.e., observed
inequality of couple earnings is greater than inequality of the distribution of ran-
dom matches. This reflects a disequalizing pattern of sorting in earnings, while
negative values of V indicate a sorting pattern that is equalizing compared to ran-
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dom matching. Note that the extreme cases of either perfect positive sorting, i.e.,
G(Y ) = Gmax(Y ) (negative sorting, i.e., G(Y ) = Gmin(Y )) imply the maximum
(minimum) values of V = 1 (V = −1). Finally, the case of V = 0 represents a
situation where inequality for observed and random sorting coincide.4
Adjusting for labor supply behavior. Sorting of couples with respect to earn-
ings, i.e., non-zero earnings correlation, does not necessarily only reflect changes
in the assortativeness in couple formation but is also affected by changes in the
coordination of couples’ labor market behavior. Consider, for example, a perfectly
negative sorting pattern where the highest earning woman and the least earning
man form a couple and vice versa. Assuming that resources are equally shared
within households, this would indicate that sorting with respect to earnings is most
equalizing. However, since earnings are a function of earnings potential (the wage
rate) and the supply of working time on the labor market (hours), it remains un-
clear whether earnings correlation rather reflects assortative mating in traits like
ability or education (“doctors marry nurses”) rather than patterns of labor market
behavior of couples (“female doctors work less when married to a male doctor”).
The latter example implies that the extent of “flocking together” with respect to
earnings may be affected by couples’ labor supply choices. Formally, household i’s
observed earnings yi depend on the spouses’ wages, hours worked and household
characteristics X i:
yis = w¯
i
s × his = w¯is × hs(w¯if , w¯im, X i) (3)
for s ∈ {f,m} and where w¯ and h denote individual hourly wage rates and hours
worked respectively. Hence, taking the thought experiment of a hypothetical random
matching of couples seriously, necessarily implies that individual hours worked would
adjust given the hypothetical household context, i.e., yis 6= yi˜s since (w¯if , w¯im, X i) 6=
(w¯i˜f , w¯
i˜
m, X
i˜). Adjusting for labor supply behavior requires an imputation of a hy-
4 Note that the interpretation of the flocking index is similar to a measure of correlation be-
tween two stochastic variables. Aaberge et al. (2005) show that the flocking index is equal to the
correlation coefficient when the Gini coefficient is replaced by the squared coefficient of variation.
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pothetical labor supply choice and, hence, earnings for randomly matched couples:
yˆi˜s = w¯
i˜
s × hˆs(w¯i˜f , w¯i˜m, X i˜). (4)
In the empirical application, the prediction of hypothetical labor supply choices
will be based on estimates of a structural model of household labor supply. The
predictions are used to calculate the level of inequality in the counterfactual cou-
ple earnings distribution, G(Ŷ ), and finally the flocking index after labor supply
adjustment:
V̂ = V̂ (Y, Ŷ ). (5)
The interpretation of the adjusted flocking index is the same as before: Positive
values indicate a disequalizing and negative values an equalizing pattern. The main
difference is that labor supply coordination given the household context is explicitly
taken into account. Comparing the unadjusted and the adjusted flocking indexes,
V and V̂ , indicates whether taking into account randomly matched couples’ labor
supply behavior changes the impact of marital sorting on inequality across couples.
This is summarized in the cross-tabulation of potential outcomes in Table 1.
Table 1: Comparison of unadjusted and adjusted flocking index
V̂ > V V̂ < V
V < 0 equalizing effect of marital equalizing effect of marital
sorting overestimated sorting underestimated
V > 0 disequalizing effect of marital disequalizing effect of marital
sorting underestimated sorting overestimated
The case of V < 0 implies an equalizing effect of sorting in earnings on inequal-
ity when not taking into account labor supply adjustments. This is in absolute
terms overestimated (underestimated) when adjusting for labor supply yields a larger
(smaller) value for V̂ . On the other hand, in the case of V > 0, the implied dise-
qualizing pattern is underestimated (overestimated) when adjusting for labor supply
yields a larger (smaller) value for V̂ . This means that observed patterns of labor
supply coordination among couple households may either cushion or exacerbate the
extent to which marital sorting affects earnings inequality across couple households.
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Structural model of household labor supply. The prediction of labor sup-
ply decisions for randomly matched couples is based on a standard approach in
counterfactual microsimulation, i.e., a structural discrete-choice model of household
labor supply and conditional logit estimation techniques.5 Assume that a couple
i’s spouses jointly maximize utility U by optimally choosing from a discrete choice
set of J combinations of working time categories (hijf , h
ij
m). Utility of couple i in
category j ∈ {1, ..., J} is given by
U ij = W (Dij, hijf , h
ij
m|X i) + ij, (6)
where W (·) captures the systematic part of the utility function with the main ar-
guments being the household’s disposable income Dij and working time of both
spouses (assuming disutility from labor) given a set of household characteristics X i.
Disposable income is given by Dij = d(w¯ifh
ij
f , w¯
i
mh
ij
m, I
i|X i), where w¯ denotes hourly
wage rates, which are assumed to be fixed across choices, and I i denotes non-labor
income. The tax-benefit function d(·) transforms labor earnings and other gross
income into disposable income given household characteristics. Unobserved hetero-
geneity in preferences is captured by adding the stochastic term, which is assumed
to be iid following a Gumbel (extreme value type I) distribution. These assump-
tions allow the empirical estimation of a conditional logit model following McFadden
(1974), where the probability that household i chooses working time category k over
all other available categories l ∈ {1, ..., J}\k is
P (U ik > U il) = P (W ik −W il > il − ik) = exp(W
ik)∑J
l=1 exp(W
il)
. (7)
The resulting set of estimated coefficients from the systematic part of the utility
function W (·) based on observed couples’ behavior can be interpreted as population
averages of preferences for disposable income and leisure given observed heterogene-
ity in household characteristics. The obtained estimates are used to predict counter-
5 See Aaberge et al. (1995), Bargain et al. (2014), Blundell and Meghir (1998), Blundell et al.
(2000), Hoynes (1996) and Van Soest (1995) for prominent examples in the literature. For a detailed
overview of microsimulation models and the empirical estimation of structural labor supply models
see Creedy and Kalb (2006).
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factual labor supply choices for randomly matched couples given hypothetical wages
(w¯i˜f , w¯
i˜
m) and household characteristics X
i˜.
There are mainly two advantages of structural approaches over reduced-form
approaches when empirically estimating labor supply models for this research ques-
tion. First, the use of reduced-form estimations is more appropriate when one is
interested in marginal effects of an intervention on labor supply (local treatment
effect). In case of further-reaching counterfactuals many relevant factors change
simultaneously (here a different household environment). Hence, analyzing labor
supply effects of (hypothetical) large-scale interventions requires a structural model
of household labor supply, which is capable of capturing all relevant determinants
simultaneously within a coherent framework of household utility maximization. Sec-
ond, the discrete-choice approach with random utility maximization is attractive,
because both the economic and the econometric model are integrated and maximum
likelihood estimation in the econometric model directly implies utility maximization
in the economic model (Aaberge et al., 1995).
Empirical estimation of labor supply model. The structural model of house-
hold labor supply and its estimation are described in (6) and (7). The systematic
part W (·) of the utility function is represented by a quadratic specification, i.e.,
the main arguments – disposable income and spouses’ working time – enter both
in linear as well as in quadratic form. In addition, several interactions of income
and leisure with household characteristics capture observed heterogeneity in labor
supply decisions (“taste shifters”).6 In addition, indicators for fixed cost of work
and working time categories are included (Van Soest, 1995).
The conditional logit estimation of (7) is based on a discrete choice set of seven
working time categories for each individual with 10, 20,...,60 hours of work per week
as well as the non-work category of zero hours. Therefore, couple households have
a choice set of 7 × 7 = 49 categories.7 This requires an imputation of disposable
6 These comprise individual spouses’ characteristics (age, age squared, indicators for high and
low skill, indicator for handicap status) as well as household characteristics (indicators for the
presence of children aged 0–2, 3–6 and 7–16, marital status and an indicator for the presence of a
person needing care).
7 The labor supply model is estimated separately for East and West Germany and separately for
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income for counterfactual working time categories. While it is straightforward to
impute gross labor earnings for counterfactual categories by multiplying the individ-
ual hourly wage rates with the number of working hours assuming that wage rates
are determined independently from working time, one of the labor supply model’s
main arguments is the households’ disposable income.8 This is imputed based on
a reduced-form regression approach (see Frenette et al., 2007; Biewen and Juhasz,
2012; Peichl, 2012; Bargain et al., 2013), where for each year t observed disposable
income of household i is the left-hand side variable. The regression equation reads
Dit = X
i
tα
x
t + Z
i
tα
z
t +XZ
i
tα
xz
t + u
i
t, (8)
where Dit is observed disposable income, Zit is a vector of gross incomes (from la-
bor, assets, private pensions and other sources) including third-order polynomials
and X it is a set of household characteristics which are relevant for tax-benefit policies
in Germany.9 The vector XZit comprises various interactions of gross incomes and
household characteristics. The error term is denoted by uit. The regression results
yield values for R2 very close to one (0.95–0.98), which means that this fairly simple
regression model captures almost the entire observed variation in disposable house-
hold incomes and, therefore, has sufficient predictive power to impute disposable
incomes in both observed and counterfactual choice categories.10
Data, sample selection and randomization. The simulation model is based
on micro data from the German Socio-Economic Panel Study (SOEP), which is a
panel survey of households and individuals that has been conducted annually since
couples with a choice set restricted to only seven working time categories (semi-flexible couples),
where only one spouse can adjust hours worked in the market flexibly and the other spouse is
in education, in military/civilian service, on parental leave, pensioner, civil servant, self-employed
or has capital income exceeding half the level of labor income. Estimation results are shown in
Appendices C.1 and C.2.
8 Wage rates are not observed for individuals currently not in employment and are estimated
on observed wages using a Heckman correction for sample selection (Heckman, 1976, 1979). Wages
are predicted for the entire sample.
9 These include marital status, age, age squared and hours worked by both spouses, indicators
for the presence of children of different ages as well as indicators for civil servants and self-employed.
10 The tax-benefit model is estimated jointly on the East and West German samples. Regression
results are shown in Appendix C.3.
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1984 and currently comprises 30 waves (Wagner et al., 2007; SOEP, 2015). Pop-
ulation weights make the respondents’ information representative for the German
population. The sample is restricted to couples (both married and unmarried) where
both spouses are of prime working age (25–59), excluding same-sex couples. The
empirical analysis is conducted on separate subsamples of couples from East and
West Germany and for the data years 1986–2010 (1996–2010 for East Germany).11
Couples observed in the data are randomly matched to each other by data year
and the East and West German subsample respectively. The main results are based
on an unconditional randomization, i.e., within each East/West and data year cell
any woman and any man can potentially be matched to form a hypothetical couple.
Additional results are based on three conditional randomization procedures in order
to make sure that predictions of hypothetical labor supply choices are not entirely
driven by certain couple characteristics. The conditional randomizations are defined
as follows: (i) randomization is conditional on marital status, i.e., married (unmar-
ried) individuals can only be randomly matched to a married (unmarried) individual
of the opposite sex, (ii) only individuals with or without dependent children in the
household can be matched to each other and (iii) randomization is conditional on
the male spouse’s age, i.e., within age quartiles.
Figure A.1 shows the correlation of spouses’ ages as observed in the data and
for different randomizations. Observed age correlation is unsurprisingly very high
and steady over time with a coefficient around 0.9. Randomization eliminates age
correlation and is close to zero for hypothetical couples. The only exception is, by
construction, randomization conditional on age with a level above 0.8. Further minor
exceptions with correlation coefficients well below 0.2 are conditional on marital
status and the presence of children, in particular for East Germany.
11 For East Germany, SOEP data are available since 1990. Here, the period 1990–1995 is
excluded since it was characterized by far reaching political and economic adjustment processes
after reunification.
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4 Results
4.1 Trends in Marital Sorting, Inequality and Labor Supply
Educational sorting. Figure 1 shows the observed educational composition of
couples in the data as well as the counterfactual after unconditional random match-
ing for both East and West Germany. The first and second columns show the shares
of couples where both spouses have the same level of education, while the third and
fourth columns show the share of couples where either the male or female spouse
has a higher level of education. It becomes apparent that there is strong sorting
on education since the share of same-education couples is more frequently observed
than one would expect from random matching. Contrary, couples with different ed-
ucational degrees are less often observed than in the random matching case. While
the level of educational sorting is higher in East than in West Germany, there is an
increasing trend in West Germany, particularly for couples with high education.
Inequality and correlation. Trends in observed earnings inequality and corre-
lation over time in both East and West Germany are shown in Figure 2.12 In West
Germany, the Gini coefficient of couples’ total labor earnings (left panel) has slightly
increased from just below 0.3 to 0.33 between the mid-1980s and 2010. This upward
trend was more pronounced for male earnings inequality, while this has been de-
creasing throughout the period under consideration for female earnings inequality,
though at a much higher level, from around 0.65 to 0.55. The high level of earnings
inequality among women in West Germany is mainly due to low participation rates
and hours worked (see below). Earnings inequality in East Germany is higher than
in the West for men and couples, but lower for women. The pronounced decrease
from the mid-2000s onwards is mainly driven by an increase in employment for both
men and women.
The right panel of Figure 2 shows the correlation of spouses’ quintiles in the
gender-specific earnings and wage distributions.13 For both East and West Germany
12 The results for labor supply, earnings inequality and correlation as well as the respective 95%
confidence intervals based on 250 bootstrap replications are displayed in Appendix B.
13 The correlation of levels cannot distinguish changes in the gender-specific marginal distribu-
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correlation in earnings has trended upward throughout the period under consider-
ation. Earnings correlation in the West changed from slightly negative to slightly
positive, though close to zero. Both the level and increase in earnings correlation
among East German couples is substantially larger. The correlation in hourly wages
is higher in the East than in the West and positive and stable for both East and
West. This indicates that changes in labor supply behavior of couples may have
played an important role. In particular, increases in female labor force participation
may not have been uniformly distributed across the distribution of male earnings
(Juhn and Murphy, 1997; Bredemeier and Juessen, 2013).
Labor supply. Figures 3 and 4 show the mean changes in observed female labor
supply by the male spouse’s earnings quintile.14 Several observations stand out.
First, the level of female labor supply, both at the extensive and intensive margin,
is substantially larger in East than in West Germany across the entire distribution
of male earnings. On average, an East German woman whose male spouse is in the
bottom quintile is more attached to the labor market than a West German woman
whose male spouse is in the top quintile. This underlines the marked difference
between East and West German women with respect to their labor market attach-
ment. Second, female labor force participation has substantially increased in West
Germany since the 1980s. Labor supply of East German women increased as well,
but to a lesser extent. Third, while the increase in West German female labor sup-
ply is observed across all quintiles of male earnings, the change is more pronounced
in the upper tail of the distribution. The relationship between female labor force
participation and the male’s position in the earnings distribution has changed from
downward sloping to a flat pattern in the West, while it is positive in East Germany.
tions from changes in the association between spouses (see Bredemeier and Juessen, 2013, p. 608).
14 The descriptive analysis is restricted to female labor force participation since male labor
supply is found to be stable with participation rates usually well above 90% and average hours
worked above 40 hours per week in both East and West Germany. See Tables B.1 and B.2 in the
Appendix.
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4.2 Impact of Marital Sorting on Inequality
The descriptive analysis in the previous section has shown that couples in East and
West Germany substantially differ with respect to the level of female labor force
attachment as well as the association of female and male earnings across the distri-
bution. The main purpose of this paper is to disentangle the cross-sectional impact
of marital sorting in earnings potential from changes in couples’ labor supply behav-
ior on earnings inequality. The observed level of cross-sectional earnings inequality
among couples is compared to two counterfactuals: (i) random matching of cou-
ples holding individual earnings constant and (ii) random matching with individual
earnings adjusted for hypothetical labor supply choices.
Comparing observed and randomly matched couples. The results for the
Gini coefficient of earnings inequality are presented in Figure 5. The solid line
reflects the observed level of couple earnings inequality discussed in the previous
section. The dashed line indicates the level of earnings inequality after random
matching of couples and taking individual earnings as given. For the West German
sample, the solid and dashed lines in the left panel are almost identical, indicating
that the sorting of couples has almost no effect on the level of earnings inequality.
Only during the 2000s there is a slight deviation indicating a limited disequalizing
impact. This is also reflected in the result for the flocking index displayed in Figure
6.15 The level above but close to zero indicates that couple sorting has an almost
neutral impact, at most marginally disequalizing, with respect to inequality in West
Germany throughout the period under consideration.16
Adjusting for labor supply choices. The dash-dotted line in Figure 5 indicates
the level of inequality after adjusting labor supply choices given the hypothetical
couples’ characteristics. The Gini coefficient is substantially below the observed
level, implying a strong equalizing impact of random matching when labor supply
15 Note that Figures 5 and 6 refer to results obtained from unconditional random matching.
Results for alternative conditional randomization schemes are displayed in Figures A.2 and A.3 in
the Appendix. Exact numbers and bootstrapped confidence intervals are shown in Table B.4.
16 Recall that the flocking index can vary between −1 (extremely equalizing) and 1 (extremely
disequalizing), while a value of zero indicates neutrality, see equation (2) and Table 1.
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choices are accounted for. This results in a flocking index for West Germany, which
is positive and large and hence implies a disequalizing effect of couple sorting, which
is underestimated when labor supply is not adjusted for. The corresponding results
for East Germany are displayed in the right panels of Figures 5 and 6. The pattern
is substantially different compared to West Germany. Random matching without
adjusting for labor supply reduces the level of couple earnings inequality compared
to observed levels. This results in a positive and large flocking index, which is
increasing over time. The adjustment for labor supply only marginally changes the
disequalizing impact of couple sorting.17
Against the background of the marked differences in female labor force partici-
pation between East and West Germany, these results are in line with the conclusion
of Greenwood et al. (2014, p. 351) who note that “for positive assortative matching
to have an impact on income inequality married females must work”. In West Ger-
many, due to the limited extent of female labor force attachment, observed female
earnings are on average too low to have a sizeable impact on inequality. This is
different in East Germany, where women are more attached to the labor market.
However, while the pattern of sorting in observed earnings in West Germany has
almost no impact on inequality, the pattern of sorting in earnings potential does
have a much stronger and disequalizing impact, which is veiled by comparably low
female labor force participation.
Heterogeneity across the distribution. Figures 7 and 8 show the mean changes
in the female participation rate and the number of hours worked by women after
adjusting for labor supply choices of randomly matched couples.18 On average,
the change in labor market participation is negative with a clear downward sloping
pattern across the distribution of hypothetical male earnings. Women who are
randomly matched to a man at the top of the distribution reduce their labor supply
more than at the bottom of the distribution. This holds for both East and West
17 Figure A.4 shows that the comparably high level of earnings correlation in East Germany is
also substantially reduced due to random matching without adjusting for couples’ labor supply
choices. The observed and counterfactual West German earnings correlations are close to zero.
18 Figures A.5 and A.6 in the Appendix show that male labor supply remains almost unchanged
after random matching of couples.
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Germany with the pattern being more pronounced in the East. The resulting pattern
for hours worked is very similar. Women randomly matched to a man at the bottom
of the earnings distribution would on average even slightly expand hours worked,
while women matched to high earning men reduce their hours.19 This result is in line
with the interpretation of male earnings having an “income effect” on female labor
supply (Reed and Cancian, 2009). For Germany, Bargain et al. (2014) indeed find
that cross-wage elasticities among couples are significantly negative and particularly
large in magnitude for Germany compared to many other countries.
5 Conclusions
This paper quantifies the impact of marital sorting on couple earnings inequality in
Germany. Observed earnings are compared to counterfactuals based on hypothetical
samples of randomly matched couples, whose counterfactual earnings are predicted
using estimates from a structural model of household labor supply. This procedure
explicitly acknowledges that earnings are to a considerable extent endogenously
determined by couples’ labor supply choices depending on spouses’ characteristics.
The main result is that the impact of marital sorting on couple earnings in-
equality depends on the choice of the counterfactual and the extent of female labor
force participation. Taking earnings of randomly matched spouses as given sug-
gests that the impact of marital sorting has been rather limited in West Germany
over the past three decades. However, adjusting for labor supply choices reveals a
pronounced disequalizing impact. In East Germany, the pattern of marital sorting
contributes to earnings inequality irrespective of adjusting for labor supply choices.
The different results for East and West Germany highlight the role of female la-
bor supply, given that marital sorting may affect inequality only if both spouses
actually work (Greenwood et al., 2014). As female employment in East Germany
is substantially higher than in the West, positive educational sorting of spouses di-
rectly translates into more inequality in East Germany than one would observe in
19 The fact that the response of female labor supply to random matching of couples is negative at
the extensive, but for some positive at the intensive margin means that especially women already
in the labor force expand their hours worked when matched to a low-earning man.
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case of random matching. In West Germany, there is positive sorting in education
as well, but its potentially disequalizing impact is veiled by relatively low female
labor force participation across the distribution.
From a policy maker’s perspective the findings of this study suggest a trade-
off. Promoting female labor force participation may come at the price of more
inequality. Since employment rates among women in West Germany have been
expanding – particularly at the top of the distribution – inequality can be expected
to increase. The implications for optimal public policies are ambiguous. On the one
hand, government intervention may not be justified since increasing female labor
force participation results from couples’ choices. On the other hand, a growing share
of dual earner couples implies a declining importance of intra-family redistribution,
which may be substituted by government redistribution. Further research should
address the welfare implications within a model of optimal taxation of couples.
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Figures
Figure 1: Educational composition of couples – Data vs. random matching
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Note: This graph shows the composition of couples by their level of education separately for West (top panel) and East Germany
(bottom panel) as observed in the data and after random matching of couples respectively. The first (second) column shows the
share of couples where both spouses have obtained a tertiary (vocational or no) educational degree. The third and fourth columns
show the share of couples where the male or female spouse holds a higher educational degree.
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Figure 2: Earnings inequality and correlation among couples
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Note: The left panel of this graph shows the Gini coefficient of couples’ total labor earnings and of male and
female labor earnings over time separately for West and East Germany. The right panel shows the correlation of
spouses’ quintiles in the gender-specific distributions of total labor earnings and hourly wage rate respectively.
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Figure 3: Female labor market participation by male earnings quintile
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Note: This graph shows the observed labor market participation rate of women by the earnings quintile of the
male spouse and by decade and separately for West and East Germany.
Figure 4: Female hours worked per week by male earnings quintile
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Note: This graph shows the observed number of women’s hours worked per week by the earnings quintile of the
male spouse and by decade and separately for West and East Germany.
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Figure 5: Earnings inequality among couples – Data vs. random matching
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Note: This graph shows the trends of Gini coefficients indicating the inequality in the distribution of couples’
labor earnings as observed in the data, after random matching and after random matching and adjustment of the
randomly matched couples’ labor supply respectively.
Figure 6: Impact of marital sorting on inequality among couples
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Note: This graph shows the trends of the impact of assortative mating on couple earnings inequality indicated by
the flocking index based on random matching and on random matching and adjustment of the randomly matched
couples’ labor supply respectively.
26
Figure 7: Adjustment of female labor market participation after random matching
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Note: This graph shows the mean change of women’s labor market participation rate by the earnings quintile of
the randomly matched male spouse for West and East Germany separately.
Figure 8: Adjustment of female hours worked after random matching
-3
-2
-1
0
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5
West East
Ch
an
ge
 in
 h
ou
rs
 p
er
 w
ee
k
Male earnings quintile
Note: This graph shows the mean change of women’s hours worked per week by the earnings quintile of the
randomly matched male spouse for West and East Germany separately.
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Appendix
A Additional Figures
Figure A.1: Age correlation among couples – Data vs. random matching
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Note: This graph shows the correlation of spouses’ age as observed in the data as well as for four different randomizations. Random
matching by marital status (presence of children) implies that randomization only occurs within the groups of married and
unmarried spouses (spouses with and without children in the household) respectively. Randomization by age groups implies that
randomization occurs within four groups defined by the male spouse’s age quartile.
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Figure A.2: Earnings inequality among couples – Data vs. random matching
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Note: This graph shows the trends of Gini coefficients indicating the inequality in the distribution of couples’ labor earnings as
observed in the data, after random matching and after random matching and adjustment of the randomly matched couples’ labor
supply respectively for four different randomizations. Random matching by marital status (presence of children) implies that
randomization only occurs within the groups of married and unmarried spouses (spouses with and without children in the
household) respectively. Randomization by age groups implies that randomization occurs within four groups defined by the male
spouse’s age quartile.
Figure A.3: Impact of marital sorting on inequality among couples
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Note: This graph shows the trends of the impact of assortative mating on couple earnings inequality indicated by the flocking index
based on random matching and on random matching and adjustment of the randomly matched couples’ labor supply respectively for
four different randomizations. Random matching by marital status (presence of children) implies that randomization only occurs
within the groups of married and unmarried spouses (spouses with and without children in the household) respectively.
Randomization by age groups implies that randomization occurs within four groups defined by the male spouse’s age quartile.
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Figure A.4: Earnings correlation among couples – Data vs. random matching
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Note: This graph shows the trends of the correlation of labor earnings within couples as observed in the data,
after random matching and after random matching and adjustment of the randomly matched couples’ labor supply
respectively.
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Figure A.5: Labor market participation – Data vs. random matching
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Note: This graph shows the trends in labor market participation by gender and for West and East Germany
separately as observed in the data as well as after random matching and labor supply adjustment of randomly
matched couples.
Figure A.6: Hours worked per week – Data vs. random matching
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Note: This graph shows the trends in hours worked per week by gender and for West and East Germany
separately as observed in the data as well as after random matching and labor supply adjustment of randomly
matched couples.
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B Additional Tables
Table B.1: Labor market participation
Men Women
Country Year Data Random and LS Data Random and LS
West Germany 1986 .94 [.93;.95] .93 [.92;.94] .55 [.52;.56] .53 [.51;.55]
1987 .94 [.94;.95] .94 [.93;.95] .56 [.54;.58] .55 [.53;.57]
1988 .94 [.93;.95] .93 [.92;.95] .59 [.57;.6] .56 [.55;.59]
1989 .94 [.93;.95] .93 [.91;.94] .61 [.6;.64] .59 [.57;.61]
1990 .94 [.93;.95] .93 [.91;.94] .62 [.6;.64] .61 [.58;.63]
1991 .95 [.94;.96] .94 [.93;.95] .64 [.62;.66] .62 [.59;.64]
1992 .95 [.94;.96] .94 [.93;.95] .65 [.63;.67] .61 [.58;.63]
1993 .95 [.93;.96] .94 [.93;.95] .66 [.64;.68] .6 [.58;.63]
1994 .94 [.93;.95] .94 [.93;.95] .65 [.63;.67] .59 [.57;.62]
1995 .92 [.91;.93] .91 [.89;.93] .64 [.62;.66] .59 [.56;.61]
1996 .92 [.91;.94] .92 [.9;.93] .66 [.63;.68] .62 [.59;.64]
1997 .92 [.91;.93] .91 [.9;.93] .66 [.64;.69] .6 [.58;.63]
1998 .92 [.91;.94] .91 [.89;.93] .66 [.64;.68] .61 [.58;.63]
1999 .95 [.93;.95] .93 [.92;.95] .70 [.67;.72] .65 [.62;.67]
2000 .96 [.95;.96] .95 [.93;.96] .72 [.70;.74] .66 [.63;.68]
2001 .95 [.94;.95] .94 [.94;.95] .72 [.70;.73] .67 [.66;.69]
2002 .93 [.92;.94] .93 [.92;.94] .72 [.70;.73] .67 [.65;.69]
2003 .93 [.92;.94] .93 [.91;.94] .71 [.69;.72] .67 [.64;.69]
2004 .93 [.92;.94] .92 [.91;.94] .72 [.70;.74] .67 [.65;.69]
2005 .93 [.92;.94] .92 [.9;.93] .72 [.70;.74] .68 [.66;.70]
2006 .92 [.91;.94] .92 [.9;.93] .72 [.70;.74] .67 [.65;.69]
2007 .92 [.91;.94] .92 [.9;.93] .72 [.69;.74] .68 [.65;.70]
2008 .94 [.93;.95] .94 [.93;.95] .76 [.74;.78] .71 [.68;.73]
2009 .94 [.93;.95] .94 [.92;.95] .79 [.77;.81] .72 [.70;.75]
2010 .94 [.93;.95] .94 [.92;.95] .78 [.75;.8] .70 [.67;.72]
East Germany 1996 .94 [.93;.95] .92 [.88;.94] .76 [.73;.79] .73 [.69;.77]
1997 .93 [.92;.95] .91 [.87;.93] .73 [.69;.77] .70 [.66;.73]
1998 .93 [.91;.95] .92 [.89;.94] .75 [.72;.79] .72 [.69;.77]
1999 .94 [.92;.95] .92 [.89;.94] .75 [.72;.79] .71 [.67;.74]
2000 .91 [.88;.93] .89 [.84;.91] .78 [.74;.8] .74 [.69;.78]
2001 .91 [.9;.93] .9 [.87;.92] .77 [.75;.8] .73 [.69;.76]
2002 .89 [.87;.91] .87 [.84;.89] .79 [.76;.81] .73 [.69;.77]
2003 .9 [.89;.92] .89 [.87;.91] .79 [.76;.82] .74 [.70;.78]
2004 .9 [.88;.92] .88 [.85;.91] .79 [.75;.81] .70 [.65;.74]
2005 .88 [.86;.91] .85 [.81;.88] .75 [.71;.78] .70 [.65;.75]
2006 .87 [.84;.9] .85 [.81;.89] .72 [.69;.77] .68 [.63;.73]
2007 .88 [.85;.9] .84 [.79;.87] .77 [.74;.8] .74 [.69;.77]
2008 .9 [.88;.93] .89 [.85;.92] .83 [.79;.86] .77 [.72;.81]
2009 .91 [.88;.94] .89 [.84;.92] .83 [.79;.87] .74 [.69;.79]
2010 .92 [.89;.95] .91 [.86;.94] .86 [.82;.89] .8 [.75;.84]
Note: This table shows the labor force participation rate as observed in the data and after random matching and
adjustment of labor supply choices. The numbers in brackets indicate 95% confidence intervals based on 250
bootstrap replications.
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Table B.2: Hours worked
Men Women
Country Year Data Random and LS Data Random and LS
West Germany 1986 42 [41.4;42.5] 41.8 [41;42.6] 17.3 [16.5;18] 18 [17.1;18.7]
1987 42.1 [41.6;42.5] 42.1 [41.3;42.9] 17.7 [17.1;18.4] 18.5 [17.6;19.3]
1988 41.4 [40.8;42] 41.3 [40.5;42.1] 18.2 [17.4;18.9] 18.7 [17.8;19.5]
1989 42.2 [41.7;42.9] 42.3 [41.5;43.2] 19.3 [18.7;20] 19.5 [18.7;20.3]
1990 41.6 [41;42.1] 41.7 [40.9;42.5] 19.3 [18.5;20.1] 19.9 [19;20.6]
1991 42.2 [41.6;42.7] 42.2 [41.4;43.2] 20.1 [19.3;20.8] 20.1 [19.2;21.1]
1992 42.4 [41.9;42.9] 42.8 [41.9;43.8] 20.2 [19.4;21] 20 [19.1;20.8]
1993 41.5 [40.9;42.1] 41.3 [40.4;42.2] 20.4 [19.6;21.2] 19.8 [18.9;20.9]
1994 42 [41.3;42.7] 42.2 [41.3;43.3] 20.4 [19.7;21.2] 19.5 [18.4;20.4]
1995 40.7 [40.1;41.3] 40.3 [39.3;41.2] 20 [19.2;21.1] 19.4 [18.4;20.6]
1996 40.6 [39.8;41.3] 40.7 [39.7;41.6] 20.3 [19.4;21.1] 20.1 [19.2;21]
1997 41.4 [40.7;42.1] 41.7 [40.8;42.6] 20.9 [20;21.8] 19.9 [18.9;20.8]
1998 40.7 [39.9;41.4] 40.8 [39.7;41.8] 21 [20.1;21.9] 20.6 [19.3;21.6]
1999 42.2 [41.6;42.8] 42.3 [41.4;43.2] 21.6 [20.8;22.6] 21 [19.8;21.9]
2000 43.3 [42.6;43.8] 43.9 [42.9;44.6] 22.4 [21.5;23.2] 21.3 [20.4;22.5]
2001 43 [42.6;43.4] 43.7 [43.1;44.3] 22.1 [21.5;22.6] 21.7 [21.1;22.3]
2002 42 [41.5;42.5] 42.8 [42;43.7] 21 [20.2;21.6] 20.6 [19.7;21.3]
2003 41.6 [41;42.2] 42.1 [41.4;42.7] 20.9 [20.1;21.5] 20.5 [19.6;21.2]
2004 41.8 [41.1;42.3] 42.3 [41.6;43.2] 21.4 [20.6;22.2] 20.8 [20;21.6]
2005 41.9 [41.3;42.4] 42.5 [41.8;43.2] 21.2 [20.4;21.8] 20.9 [20.1;21.9]
2006 41.7 [41;42.4] 42.4 [41.5;43.3] 21 [20.3;21.9] 20.7 [19.8;21.6]
2007 42 [41.3;42.6] 42.9 [41.9;43.9] 20.7 [20;21.6] 20.7 [19.7;21.6]
2008 42.5 [41.9;43.1] 43.3 [42.3;44.1] 22.4 [21.5;23.2] 21.7 [20.7;22.8]
2009 42.5 [41.9;43.2] 43.3 [42.5;44.3] 23.4 [22.5;24.2] 22.3 [21.1;23.4]
2010 42.9 [42.1;43.7] 43.5 [42.6;44.5] 23.6 [22.7;24.6] 22 [20.9;23.3]
East Germany 1996 44.3 [43.5;45.1] 44.9 [43.1;46.2] 31 [29.7;32.4] 30.5 [28.9;32]
1997 44.6 [43.5;45.4] 44.6 [42.8;46] 30.2 [28.5;31.7] 30 [28.4;31.8]
1998 44 [43;45] 45 [43.3;46.5] 30.1 [28.6;31.5] 29.9 [28.2;31.7]
1999 43.7 [42.7;44.6] 44.6 [43;46.1] 29.5 [28.1;31] 28.7 [26.8;30.2]
2000 42.8 [41.5;44] 43.2 [41.2;44.7] 30.8 [29.3;32] 30.7 [28.6;32.2]
2001 43.2 [42.3;44] 44.1 [42.6;45.3] 30.7 [29.5;32] 29.9 [28.3;31.2]
2002 42.3 [41.2;43.4] 42.3 [40.7;43.6] 30.8 [29.5;32] 29.6 [28.1;31.2]
2003 42 [40.9;43] 42.3 [41.1;43.7] 30.4 [29.2;31.6] 29.6 [27.9;31.2]
2004 41.3 [40.1;42.4] 41.3 [39.6;43] 29.9 [28.8;31.2] 28.1 [26.4;29.8]
2005 41 [39.8;42.2] 40.4 [38.4;42.1] 28.2 [26.6;29.6] 27.6 [25.5;29.2]
2006 40 [38.1;41.2] 40 [37.8;41.7] 27.6 [26;29.1] 26.9 [24.8;29.1]
2007 41.2 [39.6;42.6] 40.3 [38;42.3] 29.2 [27.8;30.7] 29.1 [27.2;30.7]
2008 42 [40.7;43.3] 42.4 [40.3;43.9] 31.7 [30.4;33.2] 30.5 [28.5;32.4]
2009 42.2 [40.6;43.5] 42.1 [39.9;43.9] 31.8 [30.3;33.4] 29.4 [27.2;31.4]
2010 42.5 [40.7;44] 42.7 [40.2;44.6] 31.6 [30.4;33.1] 30.8 [28.9;33]
Note: This table shows the number of hours worked per week as observed in the data and after random matching
and adjustment of labor supply choices. The numbers in brackets indicate 95% confidence intervals based on 250
bootstrap replications.
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Table B.3: Correlation in couple earnings
Hourly wage Labor earnings
Country Year Data Random Data Random Random and LS
West Germany 1986 .02 [-.03;.07] 0 [-.05;.05] -.01 [-.07;.03] 0 [-.05;.05] -.04 [-.09;.02]
1987 .02 [-.03;.07] 0 [-.05;.05] -.03 [-.08;.02] .01 [-.04;.05] -.03 [-.09;.03]
1988 .02 [-.04;.08] 0 [-.06;.05] -.01 [-.06;.05] 0 [-.05;.06] -.03 [-.09;.03]
1989 .02 [-.04;.08] 0 [-.06;.06] 0 [-.06;.05] .01 [-.05;.06] -.02 [-.08;.04]
1990 .02 [-.04;.08] 0 [-.05;.06] -.02 [-.07;.03] 0 [-.05;.07] -.04 [-.09;.03]
1991 .02 [-.04;.08] 0 [-.06;.06] -.01 [-.07;.05] 0 [-.06;.06] -.02 [-.08;.04]
1992 .01 [-.06;.08] 0 [-.06;.07] -.02 [-.09;.04] .01 [-.07;.07] -.01 [-.08;.06]
1993 .01 [-.05;.07] 0 [-.07;.07] 0 [-.06;.05] 0 [-.06;.07] -.01 [-.08;.06]
1994 .02 [-.04;.09] 0 [-.06;.06] -.01 [-.07;.04] .01 [-.06;.06] -.02 [-.08;.06]
1995 .01 [-.04;.09] 0 [-.07;.06] 0 [-.06;.06] .01 [-.05;.07] -.01 [-.08;.05]
1996 .02 [-.04;.09] -.01 [-.07;.06] -.01 [-.08;.04] 0 [-.06;.07] -.02 [-.09;.05]
1997 .02 [-.04;.09] 0 [-.06;.07] -.01 [-.07;.06] .01 [-.07;.09] -.02 [-.09;.04]
1998 .02 [-.05;.09] .01 [-.06;.08] .01 [-.06;.08] .01 [-.06;.09] -.01 [-.09;.06]
1999 .02 [-.05;.09] 0 [-.06;.06] .01 [-.05;.07] .02 [-.05;.08] 0 [-.07;.06]
2000 .01 [-.05;.08] -.01 [-.07;.06] 0 [-.06;.07] .01 [-.05;.08] -.01 [-.09;.05]
2001 .02 [-.03;.07] 0 [-.05;.04] .03 [-.03;.07] .01 [-.04;.06] 0 [-.06;.04]
2002 .01 [-.03;.07] 0 [-.05;.05] .01 [-.04;.07] .01 [-.03;.07] 0 [-.06;.05]
2003 .02 [-.03;.08] 0 [-.05;.06] .02 [-.03;.07] .01 [-.04;.06] 0 [-.05;.06]
2004 .02 [-.04;.08] .01 [-.06;.06] .01 [-.05;.07] .01 [-.04;.07] -.01 [-.07;.05]
2005 .02 [-.03;.08] 0 [-.06;.06] .01 [-.06;.06] .01 [-.05;.07] -.01 [-.07;.04]
2006 .02 [-.04;.09] 0 [-.07;.07] .01 [-.04;.07] .01 [-.05;.08] -.02 [-.09;.05]
2007 .04 [-.02;.1] 0 [-.06;.06] .04 [-.02;.1] .01 [-.05;.07] -.01 [-.07;.06]
2008 .04 [-.03;.11] 0 [-.07;.07] .03 [-.03;.09] .01 [-.06;.07] -.01 [-.07;.06]
2009 .03 [-.04;.1] 0 [-.07;.07] .03 [-.04;.09] .01 [-.07;.08] -.02 [-.08;.06]
2010 .03 [-.05;.11] 0 [-.08;.07] .02 [-.06;.08] .01 [-.07;.08] -.01 [-.09;.07]
East Germany 1996 .04 [-.05;.12] 0 [-.09;.1] .07 [-.01;.15] .02 [-.07;.11] .05 [-.06;.14]
1997 .05 [-.05;.14] 0 [-.1;.11] .09 [.02;.19] .02 [-.08;.12] .05 [-.05;.14]
1998 .06 [-.05;.14] 0 [-.1;.1] .07 [-.01;.15] .02 [-.08;.12] .02 [-.09;.12]
1999 .04 [-.05;.13] -.01 [-.09;.1] .06 [-.04;.15] .02 [-.09;.12] .02 [-.09;.13]
2000 .04 [-.06;.15] .01 [-.09;.11] .11 [.02;.21] .02 [-.08;.12] .04 [-.06;.14]
2001 .04 [-.03;.13] 0 [-.09;.09] .1 [.02;.19] .02 [-.07;.11] .01 [-.08;.1]
2002 .04 [-.06;.13] .01 [-.1;.09] .1 [.02;.18] .03 [-.07;.13] .03 [-.05;.13]
2003 .05 [-.04;.14] -.01 [-.11;.1] .13 [.03;.21] .02 [-.07;.12] .04 [-.06;.14]
2004 .06 [-.04;.16] 0 [-.11;.1] .12 [.04;.2] .02 [-.08;.11] .05 [-.05;.15]
2005 .06 [-.05;.18] -.01 [-.12;.11] .13 [.03;.23] .02 [-.09;.13] .05 [-.05;.17]
2006 .06 [-.07;.17] 0 [-.14;.13] .14 [.04;.24] .02 [-.09;.14] .03 [-.08;.15]
2007 .06 [-.07;.17] 0 [-.12;.13] .17 [.07;.27] .03 [-.08;.14] .05 [-.07;.19]
2008 .05 [-.07;.15] 0 [-.1;.11] .15 [.04;.26] .02 [-.09;.15] .03 [-.1;.14]
2009 .06 [-.09;.18] 0 [-.12;.12] .13 [.01;.24] .02 [-.1;.15] .02 [-.11;.16]
2010 .06 [-.06;.19] 0 [-.12;.13] .12 [0;.23] .03 [-.13;.15] .03 [-.12;.16]
Note: This table shows the correlation in hourly wages and earnings as observed in the data, after random
matching before and after adjustment of labor supply choices. The numbers in brackets indicate 95% confidence
intervals based on 250 bootstrap replications.
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Table B.4: Couple earnings inequality and flocking index
Gini coefficient Flocking index
Country Year Data Random Random and LS Random Random and LS
West Germany 1986 .29 [.28;.3] .28 [.27;.29] .23 [.22;.25] .21 [-.05;.45] .67 [.56;.78]
1987 .28 [.27;.3] .28 [.27;.3] .23 [.22;.25] .02 [-.2;.32] .58 [.47;.71]
1988 .3 [.28;.31] .29 [.28;.3] .24 [.23;.26] .16 [-.19;.44] .65 [.53;.78]
1989 .28 [.26;.29] .27 [.26;.29] .23 [.22;.24] .14 [-.17;.39] .58 [.45;.70]
1990 .28 [.26;.29] .28 [.26;.29] .23 [.21;.24] .02 [-.26;.29] .56 [.43;.67]
1991 .28 [.26;.29] .28 [.26;.29] .23 [.22;.25] .04 [-.23;.33] .53 [.39;.67]
1992 .28 [.26;.29] .28 [.26;.29] .24 [.23;.25] .02 [-.36;.35] .53 [.36;.69]
1993 .29 [.28;.3] .28 [.27;.3] .24 [.23;.26] .2 [-.2;.59] .63 [.48;.83]
1994 .28 [.26;.29] .28 [.27;.29] .24 [.22;.25] .07 [-.34;.41] .62 [.44;.77]
1995 .3 [.29;.32] .3 [.28;.32] .26 [.25;.28] .11 [-.22;.38] .56 [.38;.69]
1996 .3 [.28;.31] .29 [.28;.31] .26 [.24;.27] .07 [-.24;.39] .52 [.35;.66]
1997 .3 [.28;.31] .3 [.28;.31] .26 [.24;.28] -.04 [-.36;.32] .52 [.35;.65]
1998 .3 [.29;.31] .3 [.28;.31] .26 [.24;.27] .07 [-.28;.43] .53 [.38;.76]
1999 .3 [.29;.31] .29 [.28;.31] .26 [.25;.28] .08 [-.25;.38] .51 [.33;.66]
2000 .3 [.28;.31] .3 [.28;.31] .27 [.25;.28] .05 [-.29;.44] .47 [.29;.71]
2001 .32 [.31;.33] .31 [.3;.32] .27 [.26;.28] .24 [-.06;.49] .59 [.45;.73]
2002 .33 [.32;.34] .32 [.31;.34] .29 [.28;.3] .07 [-.18;.34] .48 [.35;.61]
2003 .33 [.32;.34] .32 [.31;.34] .3 [.28;.31] .14 [-.15;.36] .46 [.33;.6]
2004 .33 [.31;.34] .32 [.31;.33] .29 [.28;.3] .09 [-.21;.34] .45 [.31;.59]
2005 .33 [.32;.34] .32 [.31;.34] .29 [.28;.31] .14 [-.15;.42] .49 [.34;.64]
2006 .34 [.33;.36] .34 [.32;.35] .31 [.29;.32] .09 [-.17;.41] .44 [.29;.61]
2007 .34 [.33;.35] .33 [.31;.34] .3 [.29;.31] .23 [-.09;.49] .51 [.36;.66]
2008 .32 [.31;.33] .31 [.3;.33] .29 [.27;.31] .17 [-.12;.44] .47 [.3;.64]
2009 .32 [.31;.34] .32 [.3;.33] .29 [.28;.31] .14 [-.17;.43] .46 [.28;.61]
2010 .33 [.31;.34] .32 [.31;.34] .3 [.28;.32] .15 [-.24;.48] .45 [.23;.66]
East Germany 1996 .29 [.28;.31] .27 [.26;.29] .27 [.24;.29] .61 [.03;1.18] .68 [.06;1.13]
1997 .31 [.29;.33] .29 [.27;.31] .28 [.26;.31] .62 [-.02;1.07] .67 [.08;1.05]
1998 .3 [.28;.32] .28 [.26;.31] .27 [.25;.3] .32 [-.38;.8] .51 [-.05;.86]
1999 .3 [.28;.32] .29 [.27;.31] .27 [.25;.3] .39 [-.14;.92] .54 [.13;.93]
2000 .33 [.31;.35] .3 [.28;.33] .29 [.27;.33] .62 [-.05;1.39] .64 [.03;1.31]
2001 .34 [.31;.36] .31 [.29;.33] .29 [.27;.31] .51 [.03;.92] .66 [.38;.93]
2002 .35 [.33;.37] .33 [.31;.35] .31 [.29;.34] .47 [-.03;.87] .57 [.22;.92]
2003 .36 [.33;.38] .33 [.31;.36] .32 [.3;.35] .53 [.01;.95] .59 [.23;.95]
2004 .37 [.34;.4] .33 [.3;.35] .33 [.3;.36] .73 [.3;1.33] .74 [.19;1.29]
2005 .37 [.34;.39] .33 [.3;.36] .34 [.31;.37] .70 [.19;1.22] .63 [-.07;1.34]
2006 .41 [.37;.44] .35 [.32;.38] .35 [.33;.39] .84 [.29;1.47] .84 [.33;1.71]
2007 .39 [.36;.42] .33 [.3;.36] .34 [.3;.37] .86 [.44;1.38] .84 [.24;1.48]
2008 .35 [.32;.38] .31 [.29;.34] .31 [.28;.34] .84 [.28;1.75] .85 [.28;1.81]
2009 .35 [.32;.38] .31 [.28;.34] .31 [.28;.35] 1.01 [-.46;3.26] 1.03 [-.19;4.13]
2010 .35 [.32;.39] .32 [.29;.35] .31 [.28;.35] .82 [-.13;3.12] .87 [-.13;2.53]
Note: This table shows the Gini coefficient of couple earnings as observed in the data as well as the flocking index
comparing earnings inequality after random matching before and after adjustment of labor supply choices to
inequality as observed in the data. The numbers in brackets indicate 95% confidence intervals based on 250
bootstrap replications.
35
C Regression Results
C.1 Labor Supply Model (West Germany)
Table C.1: Conditional logit regression results (flex. couples, 1986–1998)
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
disp. inc. 0.004∗∗∗ -0.003∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ -0.002∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ -0.004∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗
disp. inc.2/100 -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗
disp. inc. x age (male)/100 -0.004∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ -0.010∗∗∗ -0.017∗∗∗ -0.005∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ -0.004∗∗∗ -0.003∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗ -0.004∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ -0.025∗∗∗
disp. inc. x age2 (male)/100 0.002∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ -0.009∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ -0.013∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ -0.002∗∗∗ -0.007∗∗∗ 0.032∗∗∗
disp. inc. x age (female)/100 -0.009∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ 0.000 0.003∗∗∗ -0.019∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗ -0.016∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗
disp. inc. x age2 (female)/100 0.010∗∗∗ -0.017∗∗∗ -0.006∗∗∗ -0.005∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ -0.005∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗ -0.012∗∗∗ -0.019∗∗∗ -0.019∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗ -0.008∗∗∗ -0.013∗∗∗
disp. inc. x high-skilled (male)/100 0.003∗∗∗ -0.015∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ -0.019∗∗∗ -0.015∗∗∗ -0.011∗∗∗ -0.034∗∗∗ -0.031∗∗∗ -0.020∗∗∗ -0.015∗∗∗ -0.000
disp. inc. x unskilled (male)/100 0.001∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗ -0.004∗∗∗ 0.042∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗ -0.006∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗ -0.020∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗
disp. inc. x high-skilled (female)/100 0.020∗∗∗ 0.084∗∗∗ -0.031∗∗∗ -0.019∗∗∗ -0.018∗∗∗ -0.035∗∗∗ -0.052∗∗∗ -0.033∗∗∗ -0.030∗∗∗ -0.010∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗ -0.036∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗
disp. inc. x unskilled (female)/100 -0.020∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ -0.028∗∗∗ -0.068∗∗∗ -0.043∗∗∗ -0.017∗∗∗ -0.047∗∗∗ -0.010∗∗∗ -0.027∗∗∗ -0.033∗∗∗ -0.004∗∗∗ -0.004∗∗∗ -0.045∗∗∗
disp. inc. x kids 0-2/100 -0.026∗∗∗ -0.056∗∗∗ -0.008∗∗∗ -0.095∗∗∗ -0.025∗∗∗ 0.048∗∗∗ 0.060∗∗∗ -0.004∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗ -0.002∗∗∗ 0.079∗∗∗ 0.053∗∗∗ -0.057∗∗∗
disp. inc. x kids 3-6/100 0.009∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗∗ -0.031∗∗∗ -0.027∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗ -0.038∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.033∗∗∗
disp. inc. x kids 7-16/100 0.021∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ -0.008∗∗∗ -0.017∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ -0.005∗∗∗ -0.010∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗ -0.021∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗ -0.014∗∗∗ -0.017∗∗∗
disp. inc. x married/100 0.073∗∗∗ 0.081∗∗∗ 0.043∗∗∗ -0.039∗∗∗ -0.199∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗∗ -0.051∗∗∗ 0.038∗∗∗ -0.063∗∗∗ -0.023∗∗∗ -0.044∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ -0.006∗∗∗
disp. inc. x care/100 -0.111∗∗∗ -0.091∗∗∗ -0.043∗∗∗ -0.062∗∗∗ 0.042∗∗∗ 0.106∗∗∗ -0.151∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗ -0.036∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗
leisure (male) 0.346∗∗∗ 0.354∗∗∗ 0.395∗∗∗ 0.544∗∗∗ 0.417∗∗∗ 0.343∗∗∗ 0.750∗∗∗ 0.457∗∗∗ 0.062∗∗∗ 0.258∗∗∗ 0.513∗∗∗ 0.631∗∗∗ 0.638∗∗∗
leisure (female) 0.110∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.132∗∗∗ 0.132∗∗∗ 0.229∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗ 0.404∗∗∗ 0.270∗∗∗ 0.126∗∗∗ 0.133∗∗∗ 0.208∗∗∗ 0.264∗∗∗ 0.388∗∗∗
leisure (male)2/100 -0.258∗∗∗ -0.458∗∗∗ -0.310∗∗∗ -0.738∗∗∗ -0.631∗∗∗ -0.580∗∗∗ -0.768∗∗∗ -0.517∗∗∗ -0.444∗∗∗ -0.351∗∗∗ -0.538∗∗∗ -0.571∗∗∗ -0.363∗∗∗
leisure (female)2/100 -0.216∗∗∗ -0.217∗∗∗ -0.210∗∗∗ -0.214∗∗∗ -0.214∗∗∗ -0.241∗∗∗ -0.272∗∗∗ -0.264∗∗∗ -0.228∗∗∗ -0.135∗∗∗ -0.180∗∗∗ -0.213∗∗∗ -0.210∗∗∗
leisure (male) x age (male)/100 -0.942∗∗∗ -0.147∗∗∗ -1.069∗∗∗ -0.153∗∗∗ 0.405∗∗∗ 0.186∗∗∗ -0.810∗∗∗ -0.509∗∗∗ 1.216∗∗∗ -0.064∗∗∗ -0.682∗∗∗ -1.276∗∗∗ -1.905∗∗∗
leisure (male) x age2 (male)/100 1.133∗∗∗ 0.211∗∗∗ 1.380∗∗∗ 0.326∗∗∗ -0.285∗∗∗ -0.206∗∗∗ 0.949∗∗∗ 0.671∗∗∗ -1.458∗∗∗ 0.194∗∗∗ 0.825∗∗∗ 1.506∗∗∗ 2.311∗∗∗
leisure (male) x high-skilled (male)/100 -0.682∗∗∗ -1.089∗∗∗ -1.543∗∗∗ -0.698∗∗∗ -2.854∗∗∗ -2.479∗∗∗ -1.552∗∗∗ -2.775∗∗∗ -0.285∗∗∗ -2.384∗∗∗ -4.193∗∗∗ -1.237∗∗∗ -2.787∗∗∗
leisure (male) x unskilled (male)/100 2.683∗∗∗ 2.279∗∗∗ 1.578∗∗∗ 1.596∗∗∗ 1.513∗∗∗ 1.418∗∗∗ 4.053∗∗∗ 3.390∗∗∗ 3.942∗∗∗ 2.759∗∗∗ 2.644∗∗∗ 1.626∗∗∗ 2.704∗∗∗
leisure (male) x married/100 2.280∗∗∗ -0.087∗∗∗ 2.571∗∗∗ -3.295∗∗∗ -11.507∗∗∗ -0.271∗∗∗ -3.652∗∗∗ -1.489∗∗∗ -4.089∗∗∗ -3.066∗∗∗ 0.017 1.665∗∗∗ 0.313∗∗∗
o.leisure (male) x handicap (male)/100 0.000 0.865∗∗∗ 3.822∗∗∗ 6.388∗∗∗ 0.000 3.688∗∗∗ 4.180∗∗∗ 0.000 1.456∗∗∗ 4.354∗∗∗ 5.272∗∗∗ 2.148∗∗∗ 4.646∗∗∗
leisure (female) x age (female)/100 0.204∗∗∗ 0.439∗∗∗ 0.036∗∗∗ 0.368∗∗∗ -0.009∗ 0.753∗∗∗ -0.560∗∗∗ -0.350∗∗∗ 0.521∗∗∗ -0.158∗∗∗ -0.260∗∗∗ -0.328∗∗∗ -1.246∗∗∗
leisure (female) x age2 (female)/100 0.003 -0.109∗∗∗ 0.313∗∗∗ -0.086∗∗∗ 0.305∗∗∗ -0.558∗∗∗ 0.787∗∗∗ 0.701∗∗∗ -0.407∗∗∗ 0.494∗∗∗ 0.486∗∗∗ 0.606∗∗∗ 1.771∗∗∗
leisure (female) x high-skilled (female)/100 2.706∗∗∗ 2.512∗∗∗ -1.434∗∗∗ -1.047∗∗∗ -0.350∗∗∗ -2.495∗∗∗ -4.117∗∗∗ -4.327∗∗∗ -4.964∗∗∗ -2.613∗∗∗ -1.880∗∗∗ -3.255∗∗∗ -0.937∗∗∗
leisure (female) x unskilled (female)/100 -1.140∗∗∗ -0.445∗∗∗ -0.906∗∗∗ -2.118∗∗∗ -1.630∗∗∗ -0.505∗∗∗ -1.130∗∗∗ 0.513∗∗∗ -1.070∗∗∗ -0.515∗∗∗ 0.752∗∗∗ -1.026∗∗∗ 0.088∗∗∗
leisure (female) x kids 0-2/100 3.676∗∗∗ 2.179∗∗∗ 3.447∗∗∗ 3.119∗∗∗ 3.485∗∗∗ 7.417∗∗∗ 9.966∗∗∗ 5.653∗∗∗ 9.074∗∗∗ 6.397∗∗∗ 12.047∗∗∗ 8.322∗∗∗ 4.119∗∗∗
leisure (female) x kids 3-6/100 5.926∗∗∗ 5.753∗∗∗ 4.628∗∗∗ 4.840∗∗∗ 4.638∗∗∗ 7.784∗∗∗ 4.347∗∗∗ 5.002∗∗∗ 5.392∗∗∗ 4.151∗∗∗ 5.100∗∗∗ 6.580∗∗∗ 4.928∗∗∗
leisure (female) x kids 7-16/100 2.679∗∗∗ 2.882∗∗∗ 1.665∗∗∗ 1.450∗∗∗ 2.581∗∗∗ 1.871∗∗∗ 1.074∗∗∗ 2.937∗∗∗ 3.169∗∗∗ 1.840∗∗∗ 2.313∗∗∗ 2.187∗∗∗ 2.063∗∗∗
leisure (female) x married/100 4.518∗∗∗ 8.016∗∗∗ 5.063∗∗∗ 0.679∗∗∗ -3.132∗∗∗ 4.563∗∗∗ 1.102∗∗∗ 2.492∗∗∗ -3.616∗∗∗ 0.875∗∗∗ 2.481∗∗∗ 0.825∗∗∗ 5.368∗∗∗
o.leisure (female) x handicap (female)/100 0.000 -2.049∗∗∗ -2.916∗∗∗ -0.319∗∗∗ 0.000 -3.032∗∗∗ -1.024∗∗∗ 0.000 -2.102∗∗∗ -1.310∗∗∗ -0.581∗∗∗ -0.204∗∗∗ 1.849∗∗∗
leisure (female) x care/100 -0.330∗∗∗ -2.662∗∗∗ -1.265∗∗∗ -0.237∗∗∗ 1.515∗∗∗ 2.197∗∗∗ -3.175∗∗∗ 3.947∗∗∗ 4.235∗∗∗ 5.675∗∗∗ 9.662∗∗∗ 0.530∗∗∗ 1.183∗∗∗
fixed costs (male) -4.450∗∗∗ -8.110∗∗∗ -5.433∗∗∗ -14.562∗∗∗ -12.431∗∗∗ -12.516∗∗∗ -13.792∗∗∗ -9.238∗∗∗ -9.730∗∗∗ -7.198∗∗∗ -10.487∗∗∗ -11.320∗∗∗ -6.112∗∗∗
part-time 20h (male) -1.702∗∗∗ -0.728∗∗∗ -1.090∗∗∗ 0.332∗∗∗ 0.177∗∗∗ 2.101∗∗∗ 1.517∗∗∗ 0.772∗∗∗ 1.059∗∗∗ 0.378∗∗∗ -2.111∗∗∗ 0.931∗∗∗ -1.793∗∗∗
part-time 40h (male) 1.558∗∗∗ 1.231∗∗∗ 1.487∗∗∗ 1.254∗∗∗ 1.458∗∗∗ 1.668∗∗∗ 1.091∗∗∗ 1.546∗∗∗ 1.687∗∗∗ 1.642∗∗∗ 1.661∗∗∗ 1.241∗∗∗ 1.344∗∗∗
fixed costs (female) -3.027∗∗∗ -2.744∗∗∗ -2.886∗∗∗ -2.471∗∗∗ -2.522∗∗∗ -2.695∗∗∗ -2.706∗∗∗ -2.850∗∗∗ -2.780∗∗∗ -2.005∗∗∗ -1.900∗∗∗ -2.444∗∗∗ -2.168∗∗∗
part-time 20h (female) 0.813∗∗∗ 0.829∗∗∗ 0.903∗∗∗ 0.704∗∗∗ 0.701∗∗∗ 0.779∗∗∗ 0.556∗∗∗ 0.800∗∗∗ 0.406∗∗∗ 0.610∗∗∗ 0.912∗∗∗ 0.624∗∗∗ 0.223∗∗∗
part-time 40h (female) 1.607∗∗∗ 1.570∗∗∗ 1.764∗∗∗ 1.392∗∗∗ 1.609∗∗∗ 1.492∗∗∗ 1.401∗∗∗ 1.059∗∗∗ 1.171∗∗∗ 1.269∗∗∗ 1.655∗∗∗ 1.587∗∗∗ 1.106∗∗∗
Pseudo R2 0.366 0.360 0.368 0.374 0.370 0.368 0.366 0.364 0.350 0.328 0.386 0.354 0.336
Observations 335980309 344526448 347684155 358372378 362892530 333432407 339040947 352986886 347222869 362821431 366090270 374337558 374948343
Note: This table shows results of the conditional logit estimation described in equation (7) for each year separately. The dependent
variable is the household choice of working time category. Significance levels are indicated as follows: ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗
p < 0.001.
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Table C.2: Conditional logit regression results (flex. couples, 1999–2010)
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
disp. inc. 0.003∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ -0.002∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗
disp. inc.2/100 -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗
disp. inc. x age (male)/100 -0.004∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ -0.008∗∗∗ -0.006∗∗∗ -0.007∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗ -0.019∗∗∗ -0.015∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗
disp. inc. x age2 (male)/100 0.001∗∗∗ -0.009∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ -0.017∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗ -0.015∗∗∗ -0.026∗∗∗ -0.018∗∗∗
disp. inc. x age (female)/100 -0.000∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ -0.004∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ -0.008∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ -0.014∗∗∗ -0.008∗∗∗
disp. inc. x age2 (female)/100 0.005∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ -0.014∗∗∗ -0.009∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗ -0.019∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ -0.006∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗
disp. inc. x high-skilled (male)/100 -0.003∗∗∗ -0.009∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗ -0.011∗∗∗ -0.004∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗∗ -0.036∗∗∗ -0.037∗∗∗
disp. inc. x unskilled (male)/100 -0.005∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗ 0.038∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗ 0.000 -0.047∗∗∗ -0.026∗∗∗ 0.032∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ -0.031∗∗∗ -0.046∗∗∗
disp. inc. x high-skilled (female)/100 -0.075∗∗∗ -0.003∗∗∗ -0.004∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗ -0.021∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ -0.016∗∗∗
disp. inc. x unskilled (female)/100 -0.017∗∗∗ -0.007∗∗∗ -0.014∗∗∗ -0.019∗∗∗ -0.033∗∗∗ -0.030∗∗∗ -0.046∗∗∗ -0.019∗∗∗ -0.032∗∗∗ 0.000 -0.061∗∗∗ -0.047∗∗∗
disp. inc. x kids 0-2/100 -0.075∗∗∗ -0.033∗∗∗ -0.005∗∗∗ -0.053∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.061∗∗∗ 0.035∗∗∗ -0.002∗∗∗ 0.001∗ -0.074∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗
disp. inc. x kids 3-6/100 0.015∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗ -0.024∗∗∗ -0.019∗∗∗ -0.022∗∗∗ -0.022∗∗∗ -0.002∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗ -0.009∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗
disp. inc. x kids 7-16/100 0.017∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ -0.008∗∗∗ -0.012∗∗∗ -0.005∗∗∗ -0.010∗∗∗ -0.017∗∗∗ -0.010∗∗∗ -0.014∗∗∗ -0.014∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗
disp. inc. x married/100 -0.025∗∗∗ 0.071∗∗∗ 0.088∗∗∗ -0.008∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗ -0.058∗∗∗ -0.070∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ -0.026∗∗∗ -0.033∗∗∗ -0.036∗∗∗ 0.041∗∗∗
disp. inc. x care/100 0.095∗∗∗ 0.148∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗ -0.019∗∗∗ 0.069∗∗∗ -0.022∗∗∗ -0.021∗∗∗ 0.107∗∗∗ -0.017∗∗∗ -0.041∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ -0.043∗∗∗
leisure (male) 0.189∗∗∗ 0.565∗∗∗ 0.604∗∗∗ 0.492∗∗∗ 0.614∗∗∗ 0.498∗∗∗ 0.345∗∗∗ 0.665∗∗∗ 0.481∗∗∗ 0.054∗∗∗ 0.367∗∗∗ 0.231∗∗∗
leisure (female) 0.287∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗ 0.332∗∗∗ 0.212∗∗∗ 0.257∗∗∗ 0.193∗∗∗ 0.053∗∗∗ 0.327∗∗∗ 0.353∗∗∗ 0.240∗∗∗ 0.434∗∗∗ 0.531∗∗∗
leisure (male)2/100 -0.299∗∗∗ -0.523∗∗∗ -0.642∗∗∗ -0.768∗∗∗ -0.485∗∗∗ -0.683∗∗∗ -0.579∗∗∗ -0.484∗∗∗ -0.459∗∗∗ -0.557∗∗∗ -0.422∗∗∗ -0.272∗∗∗
leisure (female)2/100 -0.211∗∗∗ -0.119∗∗∗ -0.141∗∗∗ -0.196∗∗∗ -0.181∗∗∗ -0.138∗∗∗ -0.126∗∗∗ -0.190∗∗∗ -0.115∗∗∗ -0.163∗∗∗ -0.175∗∗∗ -0.182∗∗∗
leisure (male) x age (male)/100 0.138∗∗∗ -1.351∗∗∗ -1.128∗∗∗ -0.217∗∗∗ -1.406∗∗∗ -0.151∗∗∗ 0.211∗∗∗ -1.566∗∗∗ -0.704∗∗∗ 1.139∗∗∗ -0.350∗∗∗ -0.268∗∗∗
leisure (male) x age2 (male)/100 0.017∗∗ 1.701∗∗∗ 1.346∗∗∗ 0.478∗∗∗ 1.739∗∗∗ 0.225∗∗∗ -0.027∗∗∗ 1.827∗∗∗ 0.893∗∗∗ -1.002∗∗∗ 0.553∗∗∗ 0.293∗∗∗
leisure (male) x high-skilled (male)/100 -0.315∗∗∗ -2.818∗∗∗ -1.277∗∗∗ -0.066∗∗∗ -4.042∗∗∗ -3.130∗∗∗ -1.438∗∗∗ -0.266∗∗∗ -0.501∗∗∗ 1.459∗∗∗ -3.745∗∗∗ -2.392∗∗∗
leisure (male) x unskilled (male)/100 2.208∗∗∗ 3.266∗∗∗ 3.118∗∗∗ 5.234∗∗∗ 3.515∗∗∗ 2.562∗∗∗ 0.415∗∗∗ 2.240∗∗∗ 4.843∗∗∗ 4.889∗∗∗ 2.457∗∗∗ 0.003
leisure (male) x married/100 -2.538∗∗∗ 3.561∗∗∗ 4.662∗∗∗ -1.242∗∗∗ 0.210∗∗∗ -1.324∗∗∗ -1.696∗∗∗ -0.099∗∗∗ -2.161∗∗∗ 0.985∗∗∗ -1.320∗∗∗ 2.642∗∗∗
leisure (male) x handicap (male)/100 0.088∗∗∗ 3.529∗∗∗ 1.790∗∗∗ 3.888∗∗∗ 5.550∗∗∗ 6.272∗∗∗ 1.974∗∗∗ 1.854∗∗∗ 3.807∗∗∗ 5.020∗∗∗ 6.329∗∗∗ 4.643∗∗∗
leisure (female) x age (female)/100 -0.327∗∗∗ 0.178∗∗∗ -1.361∗∗∗ -0.208∗∗∗ -0.456∗∗∗ -0.171∗∗∗ 0.300∗∗∗ -0.791∗∗∗ -1.215∗∗∗ -0.429∗∗∗ -1.286∗∗∗ -1.902∗∗∗
leisure (female) x age2 (female)/100 0.641∗∗∗ 0.042∗∗∗ 1.913∗∗∗ 0.516∗∗∗ 0.780∗∗∗ 0.398∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗ 1.205∗∗∗ 1.662∗∗∗ 0.722∗∗∗ 1.784∗∗∗ 2.425∗∗∗
leisure (female) x high-skilled (female)/100 -2.742∗∗∗ -1.477∗∗∗ -1.215∗∗∗ -2.092∗∗∗ -2.695∗∗∗ -3.281∗∗∗ -0.710∗∗∗ -1.167∗∗∗ -0.510∗∗∗ -0.310∗∗∗ -3.311∗∗∗ -4.177∗∗∗
leisure (female) x unskilled (female)/100 -0.665∗∗∗ 0.748∗∗∗ 1.318∗∗∗ 0.581∗∗∗ 1.091∗∗∗ -0.201∗∗∗ -0.352∗∗∗ 2.214∗∗∗ 0.778∗∗∗ 0.820∗∗∗ -1.321∗∗∗ -0.765∗∗∗
leisure (female) x kids 0-2/100 5.394∗∗∗ 6.032∗∗∗ 6.078∗∗∗ 5.151∗∗∗ 4.523∗∗∗ 7.064∗∗∗ 6.331∗∗∗ 7.017∗∗∗ 3.733∗∗∗ 6.257∗∗∗ 3.326∗∗∗ 9.981∗∗∗
leisure (female) x kids 3-6/100 5.585∗∗∗ 4.399∗∗∗ 3.742∗∗∗ 3.902∗∗∗ 4.317∗∗∗ 4.942∗∗∗ 4.530∗∗∗ 5.540∗∗∗ 4.010∗∗∗ 4.760∗∗∗ 3.048∗∗∗ 1.557∗∗∗
leisure (female) x kids 7-16/100 3.127∗∗∗ 2.810∗∗∗ 2.536∗∗∗ 2.110∗∗∗ 1.941∗∗∗ 1.886∗∗∗ 2.097∗∗∗ 1.770∗∗∗ 2.378∗∗∗ 2.383∗∗∗ 2.302∗∗∗ 3.379∗∗∗
leisure (female) x married/100 -0.062∗∗∗ 3.921∗∗∗ 5.162∗∗∗ 1.414∗∗∗ 2.322∗∗∗ -1.029∗∗∗ 0.320∗∗∗ 3.183∗∗∗ 1.403∗∗∗ 0.833∗∗∗ 1.747∗∗∗ 4.358∗∗∗
leisure (female) x handicap (female)/100 -1.111∗∗∗ 1.696∗∗∗ 0.979∗∗∗ 0.954∗∗∗ 1.389∗∗∗ -3.640∗∗∗ -13.156∗∗∗ 3.358∗∗∗ 3.561∗∗∗ 2.347∗∗∗ 0.031 4.377∗∗∗
leisure (female) x care/100 11.500∗∗∗ 5.306∗∗∗ 0.697∗∗∗ 3.240∗∗∗ 8.444∗∗∗ 4.823∗∗∗ 8.527∗∗∗ 6.424∗∗∗ -0.003 2.830∗∗∗ 7.768∗∗∗ 6.744∗∗∗
fixed costs (male) -5.356∗∗∗ -9.762∗∗∗ -12.963∗∗∗ -16.337∗∗∗ -9.252∗∗∗ -13.793∗∗∗ -11.757∗∗∗ -9.647∗∗∗ -7.900∗∗∗ -11.187∗∗∗ -7.316∗∗∗ -5.363∗∗∗
part-time 20h (male) -0.040∗∗∗ 1.530∗∗∗ 2.447∗∗∗ 3.637∗∗∗ 0.460∗∗∗ 1.886∗∗∗ 1.813∗∗∗ 1.467∗∗∗ 0.480∗∗∗ 1.364∗∗∗ 0.462∗∗∗ -0.437∗∗∗
part-time 40h (male) 1.702∗∗∗ 1.293∗∗∗ 1.351∗∗∗ 1.397∗∗∗ 1.347∗∗∗ 1.350∗∗∗ 1.513∗∗∗ 1.138∗∗∗ 0.905∗∗∗ 1.310∗∗∗ 1.145∗∗∗ 1.008∗∗∗
fixed costs (female) -1.680∗∗∗ -1.386∗∗∗ -1.322∗∗∗ -1.180∗∗∗ -1.054∗∗∗ -0.822∗∗∗ -0.779∗∗∗ -0.865∗∗∗ -0.788∗∗∗ -0.792∗∗∗ -0.872∗∗∗ -1.376∗∗∗
part-time 20h (female) 0.357∗∗∗ 0.366∗∗∗ 0.619∗∗∗ 0.325∗∗∗ 0.213∗∗∗ 0.518∗∗∗ 0.468∗∗∗ 0.211∗∗∗ 0.219∗∗∗ -0.082∗∗∗ -0.020∗∗∗ -0.122∗∗∗
part-time 40h (female) 1.442∗∗∗ 0.969∗∗∗ 1.169∗∗∗ 1.073∗∗∗ 1.014∗∗∗ 1.081∗∗∗ 1.223∗∗∗ 0.778∗∗∗ 0.893∗∗∗ 0.836∗∗∗ 1.078∗∗∗ 0.399∗∗∗
Pseudo R2 0.334 0.301 0.302 0.306 0.307 0.306 0.319 0.273 0.259 0.290 0.278 0.243
Observations 328039075 359586206 335907103 347417252 342410334 339452645 342166853 316847524 309467487 300035673 316216404 298504962
Note: This table shows results of the conditional logit estimation described in equation (7) for each year separately. The dependent
variable is the household choice of working time category. Significance levels are indicated as follows: ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗
p < 0.001.
Table C.3: Conditional logit regression results (semi-flex. couples, male, 1986–1998)
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
disp. inc. 0.006∗∗∗ 0.043∗∗∗ 0.198∗∗∗ 0.043∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗ -0.017∗∗∗ -0.020∗∗∗ 0.042∗∗∗ -0.055∗∗∗ 0.050∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗ -0.008∗∗∗ -0.009∗∗∗
disp. inc.2/100 -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000 0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗
disp. inc. x age (male)/100 0.102∗∗∗ -0.355∗∗∗ -0.797∗∗∗ -0.250∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗ 0.047∗∗∗ -0.058∗∗∗ -0.229∗∗∗ 0.317∗∗∗ -0.284∗∗∗ -0.157∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ -0.044∗∗∗
disp. inc. x age2 (male)/100 -0.103∗∗∗ 0.378∗∗∗ 0.947∗∗∗ 0.290∗∗∗ -0.005∗∗ -0.045∗∗∗ 0.116∗∗∗ 0.272∗∗∗ -0.359∗∗∗ 0.337∗∗∗ 0.189∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗
disp. inc. x age (female)/100 -0.113∗∗∗ 0.142∗∗∗ -0.199∗∗∗ 0.036∗∗∗ -0.093∗∗∗ 0.048∗∗∗ 0.099∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ -0.008∗∗∗ 0.040∗∗∗ 0.073∗∗∗ -0.001∗ 0.114∗∗∗
disp. inc. x age2 (female)/100 0.124∗∗∗ -0.116∗∗∗ 0.213∗∗∗ -0.044∗∗∗ 0.096∗∗∗ -0.079∗∗∗ -0.142∗∗∗ -0.015∗∗∗ -0.008∗∗∗ -0.045∗∗∗ -0.096∗∗∗ -0.018∗∗∗ -0.111∗∗∗
disp. inc. x high-skilled (male)/100 0.499∗∗∗ -0.245∗∗∗ 1.109∗∗∗ 0.661∗∗∗ 0.165∗∗∗ 0.436∗∗∗ -0.070∗∗∗ 0.050∗∗∗ -0.008∗∗∗ 0.199∗∗∗ -0.009∗∗∗ -0.088∗∗∗ 0.135∗∗∗
disp. inc. x unskilled (male)/100 -0.031∗∗∗ 0.520∗∗∗ -0.262∗∗∗ -0.251∗∗∗ 0.674∗∗∗ 0.067∗∗∗ 0.446∗∗∗ 0.428∗∗∗ 0.796∗∗∗ 0.034∗∗∗ -0.096∗∗∗ 0.207∗∗∗ 0.666∗∗∗
disp. inc. x high-skilled (female)/100 0.034∗∗∗ -0.028∗∗∗ -0.121∗∗∗ -0.320∗∗∗ 0.069∗∗∗ -0.067∗∗∗ -0.104∗∗∗ -0.083∗∗∗ -0.133∗∗∗ -0.036∗∗∗ 0.072∗∗∗ -0.078∗∗∗ 0.196∗∗∗
disp. inc. x unskilled (female)/100 -0.050∗∗∗ -0.017∗∗∗ -0.226∗∗∗ -0.060∗∗∗ -0.079∗∗∗ -0.072∗∗∗ 0.096∗∗∗ -0.266∗∗∗ 0.317∗∗∗ 0.206∗∗∗ -0.050∗∗∗ 0.105∗∗∗ -0.283∗∗∗
disp. inc. x kids 0-2/100 -0.008∗∗∗ 0.188∗∗∗ 0.188∗∗∗ -0.282∗∗∗ -0.148∗∗∗ -0.032∗∗∗ -0.057∗∗∗ 0.154∗∗∗ -0.224∗∗∗ 0.034∗∗∗ -0.044∗∗∗ 0.043∗∗∗ -0.075∗∗∗
disp. inc. x kids 3-6/100 0.095∗∗∗ -0.008∗∗∗ -0.056∗∗∗ 0.100∗∗∗ 0.076∗∗∗ -0.037∗∗∗ 0.039∗∗∗ 0.064∗∗∗ -0.109∗∗∗ -0.076∗∗∗ -0.096∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗ -0.058∗∗∗
disp. inc. x kids 7-16/100 0.100∗∗∗ 0.115∗∗∗ -0.077∗∗∗ -0.034∗∗∗ -0.127∗∗∗ -0.056∗∗∗ -0.077∗∗∗ 0.101∗∗∗ -0.040∗∗∗ 0.057∗∗∗ -0.030∗∗∗ -0.132∗∗∗ -0.046∗∗∗
disp. inc. x married/100 -0.557∗∗∗ 0.109∗∗∗ 0.312∗∗∗ 0.177∗∗∗ 0.293∗∗∗ 0.370∗∗∗ 0.789∗∗∗ -0.189∗∗∗ -0.606∗∗∗ -0.122∗∗∗ -0.109∗∗∗ 0.242∗∗∗ -0.381∗∗∗
disp. inc. x care/100 0.138∗∗∗ 0.133∗∗∗ -0.032∗∗∗ 0.060∗∗∗ -0.182∗∗∗ 0.176∗∗∗ -0.433∗∗∗ -0.568∗∗∗ -0.109∗∗∗ -0.153∗∗∗ -0.486∗∗∗
leisure (male) 0.233∗∗∗ 1.939∗∗∗ 7.377∗∗∗ 4.395∗∗∗ 1.201∗∗∗ -0.203∗∗∗ 0.389∗∗∗ 2.538∗∗∗ -1.810∗∗∗ 2.716∗∗∗ 3.199∗∗∗ 1.873∗∗∗ 1.283∗∗∗
leisure (male)2/100 -0.396∗∗∗ -0.437∗∗∗ -0.610∗∗∗ -3.701∗∗∗ -0.583∗∗∗ -0.937∗∗∗ -1.368∗∗∗ -0.982∗∗∗ -1.429∗∗∗ -1.167∗∗∗ -3.866∗∗∗ -1.492∗∗∗ -1.351∗∗∗
leisure (male) x age (male)/100 0.219∗∗∗ -7.738∗∗∗ -34.676∗∗∗ -12.517∗∗∗ -4.335∗∗∗ 2.904∗∗∗ 0.385∗∗∗ -7.433∗∗∗ 15.113∗∗∗ -9.615∗∗∗ -5.481∗∗∗ -5.863∗∗∗ -2.026∗∗∗
leisure (male) x age2 (male)/100 0.011 9.545∗∗∗ 40.182∗∗∗ 14.979∗∗∗ 5.327∗∗∗ -3.613∗∗∗ 1.067∗∗∗ 8.359∗∗∗ -17.075∗∗∗ 11.826∗∗∗ 6.554∗∗∗ 7.491∗∗∗ 2.366∗∗∗
leisure (male) x high-skilled (male)/100 17.531∗∗∗ -9.946∗∗∗ 60.181∗∗∗ 24.727∗∗∗ 10.324∗∗∗ 28.922∗∗∗ 3.746∗∗∗ -3.967∗∗∗ -8.434∗∗∗ 2.951∗∗∗ -0.926∗∗∗ -12.379∗∗∗ 8.190∗∗∗
leisure (male) x unskilled (male)/100 -2.126∗∗∗ 21.396∗∗∗ -10.317∗∗∗ -14.830∗∗∗ 23.461∗∗∗ 13.208∗∗∗ 16.132∗∗∗ 9.951∗∗∗ 42.491∗∗∗ 13.723∗∗∗ -4.104∗∗∗ 18.646∗∗∗ 18.226∗∗∗
leisure (male) x married/100 -9.138∗∗∗ -8.764∗∗∗ 10.572∗∗∗ -0.851∗∗∗ 7.553∗∗∗ 30.480∗∗∗ 13.585∗∗∗ -37.528∗∗∗ -58.084∗∗∗ -8.436∗∗∗ -1.503∗∗∗ 14.320∗∗∗ -15.192∗∗∗
o.leisure (male) x handicap (male)/100 0.000 27.743∗∗∗ -36.410∗∗∗ -11.511∗∗∗ 0.000 -19.542∗∗∗ -19.568∗∗∗ 0.000 6.295∗∗∗ 4.356∗∗∗ 3.764∗∗∗ 8.968∗∗∗ 6.787∗∗∗
fixed costs (male) -7.149∗∗∗ -1.842∗∗∗ -3.469∗∗∗ -101.339 -8.452∗∗∗ -14.539∗∗∗ -24.419∗∗∗ -5.499∗∗∗ -27.125∗∗∗ -18.705∗∗∗ -105.646 -24.455∗∗∗ -27.469∗∗∗
part-time 20h (male) -21.005 -22.194 -0.270∗∗∗ 38.339∗∗∗ 0.323∗∗∗ -19.105 7.274∗∗∗ -0.771∗∗∗ 7.624∗∗∗ -17.867 38.822∗∗∗ 6.336∗∗∗ -16.803
part-time 40h (male) 1.264∗∗∗ 1.313∗∗∗ 1.900∗∗∗ 7.656∗∗∗ 1.742∗∗∗ 0.901∗∗∗ 1.391∗∗∗ 0.816∗∗∗ 2.401∗∗∗ 1.350∗∗∗ 7.022∗∗∗ 1.307∗∗∗ 1.850∗∗∗
o.disp. inc. x care/100 0.000 0.000
Pseudo R2 0.423 0.474 0.532 0.584 0.543 0.508 0.496 0.518 0.603 0.573 0.492 0.537 0.560
Observations 3164238 4192720 3249659 4095917 4056213 6438754 7099575 5814263 7190974 7975051 8741341 8963486 9452198
Note: This table shows results of the conditional logit estimation described in equation (7) for each year separately. The dependent
variable is the household choice of working time category. Significance levels are indicated as follows: ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗
p < 0.001.
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Table C.4: Conditional logit regression results (semi-flex. couples, male, 1999–2010)
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
disp. inc. 0.012∗∗∗ 0.000 -0.026∗∗∗ -0.011∗∗∗ -0.014∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗ -0.015∗∗∗
disp. inc.2/100 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗
disp. inc. x age (male)/100 -0.058∗∗∗ -0.092∗∗∗ 0.087∗∗∗ 0.062∗∗∗ 0.095∗∗∗ -0.030∗∗∗ -0.067∗∗∗ -0.086∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗ -0.098∗∗∗ -0.035∗∗∗ 0.046∗∗∗
disp. inc. x age2 (male)/100 0.075∗∗∗ 0.147∗∗∗ -0.090∗∗∗ -0.074∗∗∗ -0.114∗∗∗ 0.050∗∗∗ 0.080∗∗∗ 0.100∗∗∗ -0.016∗∗∗ 0.111∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗ -0.050∗∗∗
disp. inc. x age (female)/100 -0.005∗∗∗ 0.077∗∗∗ 0.032∗∗∗ -0.003∗∗∗ -0.025∗∗∗ -0.035∗∗∗ -0.003∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗ -0.013∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗∗ -0.016∗∗∗ 0.035∗∗∗
disp. inc. x age2 (female)/100 0.007∗∗∗ -0.113∗∗∗ -0.050∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.042∗∗∗ 0.036∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗ -0.027∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗ -0.025∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗ -0.040∗∗∗
disp. inc. x high-skilled (male)/100 -0.153∗∗∗ 0.358∗∗∗ -0.034∗∗∗ -0.047∗∗∗ 0.084∗∗∗ 0.063∗∗∗ -0.293∗∗∗ 0.227∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗ 0.130∗∗∗ 0.040∗∗∗
disp. inc. x unskilled (male)/100 -0.031∗∗∗ 0.369∗∗∗ 0.190∗∗∗ 0.052∗∗∗ 0.573∗∗∗ 0.216∗∗∗ 0.404∗∗∗ -0.012∗∗∗ 0.074∗∗∗ -0.655∗∗∗ 0.514∗∗∗ 0.043∗∗∗
disp. inc. x high-skilled (female)/100 0.017∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ -0.045∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗∗ 0.031∗∗∗ 0.045∗∗∗ -0.019∗∗∗ 0.099∗∗∗ -0.050∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗ -0.043∗∗∗
disp. inc. x unskilled (female)/100 -0.052∗∗∗ -0.026∗∗∗ -0.110∗∗∗ -0.058∗∗∗ -0.077∗∗∗ 0.061∗∗∗ -0.025∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ -0.214∗∗∗ -0.102∗∗∗ -0.017∗∗∗
disp. inc. x kids 0-2/100 0.051∗∗∗ 0.067∗∗∗ -0.052∗∗∗ -0.050∗∗∗ 0.036∗∗∗ -0.060∗∗∗ -0.027∗∗∗ -0.018∗∗∗ -0.040∗∗∗ 0.041∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.044∗∗∗
disp. inc. x kids 3-6/100 0.037∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗ -0.004∗∗∗ -0.006∗∗∗ -0.010∗∗∗ -0.036∗∗∗ 0.039∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ -0.008∗∗∗ 0.076∗∗∗ -0.012∗∗∗ -0.012∗∗∗
disp. inc. x kids 7-16/100 -0.027∗∗∗ -0.011∗∗∗ -0.035∗∗∗ -0.016∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ -0.012∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗ 0.043∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ -0.038∗∗∗
disp. inc. x married/100 0.055∗∗∗ -0.223∗∗∗ 0.232∗∗∗ -0.085∗∗∗ -0.057∗∗∗ -0.338∗∗∗ -0.112∗∗∗ -0.141∗∗∗ -0.080∗∗∗ -0.054∗∗∗ 0.074∗∗∗ -0.064∗∗∗
disp. inc. x care/100 -0.220∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗ 0.106∗∗∗ 0.477∗∗∗ 0.051∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗ -0.027∗∗∗ -0.087∗∗∗ 0.045∗∗∗ 0.453∗∗∗ -0.357∗∗∗
leisure (male) 1.028∗∗∗ 0.948∗∗∗ -0.082∗∗∗ 0.323∗∗∗ -0.173∗∗∗ 0.818∗∗∗ 1.374∗∗∗ 1.196∗∗∗ 0.321∗∗∗ 1.059∗∗∗ 0.979∗∗∗ 0.584∗∗∗
leisure (male)2/100 -0.658∗∗∗ -0.985∗∗∗ -0.761∗∗∗ -1.192∗∗∗ -0.935∗∗∗ -0.519∗∗∗ -0.734∗∗∗ -0.636∗∗∗ -0.624∗∗∗ -0.418∗∗∗ -0.803∗∗∗ -0.582∗∗∗
leisure (male) x age (male)/100 -2.978∗∗∗ -2.207∗∗∗ 2.154∗∗∗ 2.125∗∗∗ 3.969∗∗∗ -2.460∗∗∗ -4.439∗∗∗ -3.768∗∗∗ 0.490∗∗∗ -3.483∗∗∗ -1.731∗∗∗ -0.513∗∗∗
leisure (male) x age2 (male)/100 3.762∗∗∗ 3.217∗∗∗ -2.136∗∗∗ -2.141∗∗∗ -4.268∗∗∗ 3.654∗∗∗ 5.840∗∗∗ 4.648∗∗∗ -0.428∗∗∗ 3.717∗∗∗ 1.583∗∗∗ 0.529∗∗∗
leisure (male) x high-skilled (male)/100 -9.404∗∗∗ 12.746∗∗∗ -0.130∗ -1.696∗∗∗ 3.978∗∗∗ 2.465∗∗∗ -15.501∗∗∗ 11.729∗∗∗ 3.742∗∗∗ -0.078 7.849∗∗∗ -5.329∗∗∗
leisure (male) x unskilled (male)/100 0.164∗ 19.456∗∗∗ 18.603∗∗∗ 8.036∗∗∗ 18.243∗∗∗ 12.414∗∗∗ 18.476∗∗∗ 6.320∗∗∗ 5.870∗∗∗ -19.499∗∗∗ 7.921∗∗∗ -6.534∗∗∗
leisure (male) x married/100 -3.512∗∗∗ -4.794∗∗∗ 7.548∗∗∗ -7.149∗∗∗ -3.628∗∗∗ -11.070∗∗∗ -3.351∗∗∗ -6.078∗∗∗ -1.493∗∗∗ 0.215∗∗ -0.613∗∗∗ -0.776∗∗∗
leisure (male) x handicap (male)/100 5.468∗∗∗ -13.255∗∗∗ -4.518∗∗∗ 0.197∗ -3.459∗∗∗ 1.170∗∗∗ 3.548∗∗∗ 9.099∗∗∗ 0.082 0.948∗∗∗ 7.716∗∗∗
fixed costs (male) -13.030∗∗∗ -18.982∗∗∗ -11.266∗∗∗ -26.014∗∗∗ -16.208∗∗∗ -8.936∗∗∗ -11.646∗∗∗ -10.714∗∗∗ -11.207∗∗∗ -6.551∗∗∗ -14.195∗∗∗ -8.699∗∗∗
part-time 20h (male) 0.564∗∗∗ 5.437∗∗∗ 2.259∗∗∗ 5.633∗∗∗ 1.853∗∗∗ -2.228∗∗∗ 1.334∗∗∗ 2.297∗∗∗ 0.455∗∗∗ 1.556∗∗∗ 3.255∗∗∗ 0.229∗∗∗
part-time 40h (male) 1.377∗∗∗ 1.313∗∗∗ 0.975∗∗∗ 1.503∗∗∗ 0.830∗∗∗ 1.129∗∗∗ 0.993∗∗∗ 1.051∗∗∗ 0.948∗∗∗ 0.986∗∗∗ 0.391∗∗∗ 0.697∗∗∗
o.disp. inc. x care/100 0.000
o.leisure (male) x handicap (male)/100 0.000
Pseudo R2 0.426 0.444 0.432 0.466 0.465 0.426 0.430 0.395 0.396 0.338 0.354 0.386
Observations 8973531 9148251 10699150 8193577 7222334 8293894 7630784 7052122 7820701 7353997 7540848 7832090
Note: This table shows results of the conditional logit estimation described in equation (7) for each year separately. The dependent
variable is the household choice of working time category. Significance levels are indicated as follows: ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗
p < 0.001.
Table C.5: Conditional logit regression results (semi-flex. couples, female, 1986–
1998)
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
choice
disp. inc. -0.005∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ -0.005∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ -0.003∗∗∗ -0.007∗∗∗ -0.014∗∗∗
disp. inc.2/100 -0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗
disp. inc. x age (male)/100 -0.010∗∗∗ -0.046∗∗∗ -0.035∗∗∗ -0.005∗∗∗ -0.039∗∗∗ -0.010∗∗∗ -0.013∗∗∗ -0.009∗∗∗ 0.040∗∗∗ -0.048∗∗∗ -0.042∗∗∗ -0.019∗∗∗ 0.040∗∗∗
disp. inc. x age2 (male)/100 0.012∗∗∗ 0.051∗∗∗ 0.039∗∗∗ -0.004∗∗∗ 0.037∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ -0.048∗∗∗ 0.047∗∗∗ 0.038∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ -0.044∗∗∗
disp. inc. x age (female)/100 0.026∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗ -0.054∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗ 0.001 -0.018∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ -0.019∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗ 0.061∗∗∗ 0.054∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗
disp. inc. x age2 (female)/100 -0.014∗∗∗ -0.013∗∗∗ -0.025∗∗∗ 0.067∗∗∗ -0.014∗∗∗ -0.006∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗ -0.009∗∗∗ 0.032∗∗∗ -0.024∗∗∗ -0.057∗∗∗ -0.051∗∗∗ -0.017∗∗∗
disp. inc. x high-skilled (male)/100 -0.089∗∗∗ -0.097∗∗∗ -0.078∗∗∗ -0.047∗∗∗ -0.125∗∗∗ -0.045∗∗∗ -0.017∗∗∗ -0.034∗∗∗ -0.081∗∗∗ -0.136∗∗∗ -0.049∗∗∗ -0.074∗∗∗ -0.038∗∗∗
disp. inc. x unskilled (male)/100 -0.036∗∗∗ -0.041∗∗∗ -0.043∗∗∗ 0.105∗∗∗ -0.044∗∗∗ -0.029∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗ -0.009∗∗∗ -0.065∗∗∗ -0.118∗∗∗ -0.107∗∗∗ -0.058∗∗∗ 0.074∗∗∗
disp. inc. x high-skilled (female)/100 -0.035∗∗∗ -0.096∗∗∗ 0.065∗∗∗ 0.003∗ 0.693∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗ -0.029∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗ 0.097∗∗∗ 0.035∗∗∗ 0.038∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗
disp. inc. x unskilled (female)/100 0.062∗∗∗ -0.107∗∗∗ -0.036∗∗∗ -0.158∗∗∗ -0.007∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ -0.283∗∗∗ -0.007∗∗∗ 0.119∗∗∗ -0.033∗∗∗ 0.104∗∗∗ -0.234∗∗∗ -0.136∗∗∗
disp. inc. x kids 0-2/100 0.017∗∗∗ -0.123∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗ 0.002 0.020∗∗∗ -0.052∗∗∗ -0.146∗∗∗ -0.019∗∗∗ 0.051∗∗∗ -0.346∗∗∗ -0.249∗∗∗ -0.055∗∗∗ 0.044∗∗∗
disp. inc. x kids 3-6/100 0.070∗∗∗ -0.083∗∗∗ -0.164∗∗∗ -0.120∗∗∗ -0.418∗∗∗ -0.026∗∗∗ -0.081∗∗∗ -0.045∗∗∗ 0.037∗∗∗ 0.046∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.055∗∗∗ -0.098∗∗∗
disp. inc. x kids 7-16/100 -0.059∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.049∗∗∗ -0.086∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ -0.014∗∗∗ -0.022∗∗∗ -0.033∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗ -0.194∗∗∗ -0.057∗∗∗ 0.036∗∗∗ 0.071∗∗∗
disp. inc. x married/100 0.178∗∗∗ -0.015∗∗∗ 0.002 0.336∗∗∗ -0.375∗∗∗ -0.007∗∗∗ 0.367∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ -0.011∗∗∗ 0.137∗∗∗ -0.051∗∗∗ -0.096∗∗∗ 0.055∗∗∗
disp. inc. x care/100 -5159.989 -1.103∗∗∗ 4.175∗∗∗ 0.536∗∗∗ 2.093∗∗∗ -6.712 1.753∗∗∗ -4.264 -262.290 0.756∗∗∗ 0.095∗∗∗ -1.002∗∗∗
leisure (female) -0.256∗∗∗ 0.059∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.461∗∗∗ -0.032∗∗∗ 0.128∗∗∗ 0.215∗∗∗ 0.183∗∗∗ 0.122∗∗∗ 0.403∗∗∗ -0.338∗∗∗ 0.031∗∗∗ -0.408∗∗∗
leisure (female)2/100 -0.195∗∗∗ -0.118∗∗∗ -0.144∗∗∗ -0.352∗∗∗ -0.214∗∗∗ -0.108∗∗∗ -0.112∗∗∗ -0.211∗∗∗ -0.290∗∗∗ -0.163∗∗∗ -0.150∗∗∗ -0.166∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗
leisure (female) x age (female)/100 1.344∗∗∗ 0.048∗∗∗ 0.835∗∗∗ -1.418∗∗∗ 0.885∗∗∗ 0.028∗ -0.698∗∗∗ 0.077∗∗∗ 0.334∗∗∗ -1.419∗∗∗ 2.320∗∗∗ 0.250∗∗∗ 1.847∗∗∗
leisure (female) x age2 (female)/100 -0.866∗∗∗ 0.447∗∗∗ -0.851∗∗∗ 1.809∗∗∗ -0.368∗∗∗ -0.031∗ 0.842∗∗∗ 0.004 0.054∗∗∗ 1.889∗∗∗ -2.265∗∗∗ 0.197∗∗∗ -1.723∗∗∗
leisure (female) x high-skilled (female)/100 -3.887∗∗∗ -4.148∗∗∗ 0.244∗∗∗ -2.037∗∗∗ 15.735∗∗∗ -0.197∗∗∗ 1.806∗∗∗ -0.248∗∗∗ -0.787∗∗∗ -2.543∗∗∗ -1.643∗∗∗ -2.158∗∗∗ -3.905∗∗∗
leisure (female) x unskilled (female)/100 4.150∗∗∗ -2.252∗∗∗ 1.851∗∗∗ -1.883∗∗∗ 0.738∗∗∗ -0.089∗ -6.054∗∗∗ 0.029 7.621∗∗∗ -0.218∗∗∗ 2.273∗∗∗ -2.191∗∗∗ 3.146∗∗∗
leisure (female) x kids 0-2/100 4.641∗∗∗ -0.746∗∗∗ 1.957∗∗∗ 3.602∗∗∗ 7.066∗∗∗ 1.716∗∗∗ 0.041 2.120∗∗∗ 5.818∗∗∗ -5.883∗∗∗ 4.784∗∗∗ 1.854∗∗∗ 5.121∗∗∗
leisure (female) x kids 3-6/100 6.355∗∗∗ 3.826∗∗∗ -0.039 0.870∗∗∗ -8.851∗∗∗ 0.684∗∗∗ 1.268∗∗∗ 0.802∗∗∗ 5.964∗∗∗ 7.406∗∗∗ 7.544∗∗∗ 7.266∗∗∗ 1.623∗∗∗
leisure (female) x kids 7-16/100 1.344∗∗∗ 3.771∗∗∗ 3.130∗∗∗ 0.772∗∗∗ 3.115∗∗∗ 0.805∗∗∗ 0.622∗∗∗ 1.347∗∗∗ 4.578∗∗∗ -2.810∗∗∗ 1.719∗∗∗ 5.224∗∗∗ 7.682∗∗∗
leisure (female) x married/100 9.134∗∗∗ -3.529∗∗∗ -4.800∗∗∗ 17.874∗∗∗ -2.060∗∗∗ 0.218∗∗ 9.780∗∗∗ -0.593∗∗∗ -0.352∗∗∗ 1.542∗∗∗ -4.144∗∗∗ -2.123∗∗∗ -4.839∗∗∗
o.leisure (female) x handicap (female)/100 0.000 -1.957∗∗∗ -5.475∗∗∗ 8.712∗∗∗ 0.000 303.091 -25.358∗∗∗ 0.000 -7.704∗∗∗ -5.688∗∗∗ -7.336∗∗∗ -6.204∗∗∗ 0.000
leisure (female) x care/100 -54306.815 -36.217∗∗∗ 127.401∗∗∗ -0.830∗∗∗ 66.171∗∗∗ 200.301 70.045∗∗∗ 245.982 -15944.037 37.270∗∗∗ -0.673∗∗∗ -17.878∗∗∗
fixed costs (female) -3.081∗∗∗ -2.816∗∗∗ -2.573∗∗∗ -3.414∗∗∗ -1.885∗∗∗ -2.094∗∗∗ -1.097∗∗∗ -3.191∗∗∗ -2.947∗∗∗ -2.344∗∗∗ -0.880∗∗∗ -2.021∗∗∗ -1.296∗∗∗
part-time 20h (female) 0.679∗∗∗ 1.538∗∗∗ 0.596∗∗∗ 0.139∗∗∗ 0.917∗∗∗ 0.907∗∗∗ 0.352∗∗∗ 0.760∗∗∗ 0.884∗∗∗ 1.367∗∗∗ 0.544∗∗∗ 0.679∗∗∗ 1.515∗∗∗
part-time 40h (female) 1.252∗∗∗ 1.470∗∗∗ 1.383∗∗∗ 0.951∗∗∗ 1.748∗∗∗ 1.170∗∗∗ 1.201∗∗∗ 1.457∗∗∗ 1.154∗∗∗ 1.093∗∗∗ 1.761∗∗∗ 0.769∗∗∗ 1.874∗∗∗
o.disp. inc. x care/100 0.000
o.leisure (female) x care/100 0.000
Pseudo R2 0.386 0.334 0.290 0.280 0.325 0.203 0.226 0.207 0.253 0.249 0.271 0.220 0.309
Observations 12591481 11972737 13758332 12470703 12258477 11132632 14587580 12827808 12650008 13386891 17437336 13918247 13668123
Note: This table shows results of the conditional logit estimation described in equation (7) for each year separately. The dependent
variable is the household choice of working time category. Significance levels are indicated as follows: ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗
p < 0.001.
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Table C.6: Conditional logit regression results (semi-flex. couples, female, 1999–
2010)
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
disp. inc. -0.014∗∗∗ -0.003∗∗∗ -0.002∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ -0.009∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ -0.000 0.000∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗ -0.004∗∗∗
disp. inc.2/100 -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗
disp. inc. x age (male)/100 0.030∗∗∗ 0.054∗∗∗ -0.004∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ -0.042∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗∗ -0.022∗∗∗ -0.088∗∗∗ 0.067∗∗∗ -0.026∗∗∗ 0.055∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗
disp. inc. x age2 (male)/100 -0.028∗∗∗ -0.052∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ -0.009∗∗∗ 0.041∗∗∗ -0.026∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗ 0.093∗∗∗ -0.067∗∗∗ 0.036∗∗∗ -0.060∗∗∗ -0.006∗∗∗
disp. inc. x age (female)/100 0.036∗∗∗ -0.053∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗ -0.018∗∗∗ 0.103∗∗∗ -0.029∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗ 0.092∗∗∗ -0.113∗∗∗ -0.046∗∗∗ -0.109∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗
disp. inc. x age2 (female)/100 -0.042∗∗∗ 0.070∗∗∗ -0.032∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗ -0.112∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗ -0.024∗∗∗ -0.100∗∗∗ 0.132∗∗∗ 0.051∗∗∗ 0.131∗∗∗ -0.031∗∗∗
disp. inc. x high-skilled (male)/100 -0.011∗∗∗ -0.109∗∗∗ -0.025∗∗∗ -0.031∗∗∗ -0.035∗∗∗ -0.019∗∗∗ -0.062∗∗∗ -0.042∗∗∗ -0.122∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗ -0.058∗∗∗ -0.100∗∗∗
disp. inc. x unskilled (male)/100 0.141∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗ -0.104∗∗∗ -0.014∗∗∗ -0.215∗∗∗ 0.050∗∗∗ -0.005∗∗∗ 0.512∗∗∗ -0.017∗∗∗ -0.022∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗ 0.107∗∗∗
disp. inc. x high-skilled (female)/100 0.064∗∗∗ 0.084∗∗∗ -0.063∗∗∗ -0.015∗∗∗ -0.052∗∗∗ 0.055∗∗∗ -0.010∗∗∗ 0.060∗∗∗ 0.093∗∗∗ -0.159∗∗∗ 0.061∗∗∗ 0.104∗∗∗
disp. inc. x unskilled (female)/100 0.178∗∗∗ -0.148∗∗∗ 0.040∗∗∗ 0.077∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.094∗∗∗ 0.249∗∗∗ 0.424∗∗∗ 0.207∗∗∗ -0.072∗∗∗ -0.120∗∗∗ 0.115∗∗∗
disp. inc. x kids 0-2/100 -0.218∗∗∗ -0.238∗∗∗ 0.073∗∗∗ -0.030∗∗∗ 0.035∗∗∗ 0.089∗∗∗ 0.208∗∗∗ -0.078∗∗∗ -0.023∗∗∗ 0.184∗∗∗ -0.335∗∗∗ 0.148∗∗∗
disp. inc. x kids 3-6/100 0.360∗∗∗ 0.034∗∗∗ -0.097∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗ -0.016∗∗∗ -0.048∗∗∗ -0.021∗∗∗ -0.148∗∗∗ -0.042∗∗∗ 0.189∗∗∗ -0.106∗∗∗ -0.023∗∗∗
disp. inc. x kids 7-16/100 0.034∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗ -0.016∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗ -0.042∗∗∗ -0.017∗∗∗ -0.003∗∗∗ -0.027∗∗∗ 0.058∗∗∗ 0.145∗∗∗ -0.032∗∗∗ -0.072∗∗∗
disp. inc. x married/100 -0.103∗∗∗ -0.111∗∗∗ 0.035∗∗∗ -0.056∗∗∗ -0.219∗∗∗ 0.041∗∗∗ -0.142∗∗∗ 0.079∗∗∗ -0.165∗∗∗ -0.388∗∗∗ -0.073∗∗∗ 0.254∗∗∗
disp. inc. x care/100 -3.440∗∗∗ -0.430∗∗∗ 0.031∗∗∗ 0.356∗∗∗ -0.186∗∗∗ 1.081∗∗∗ -0.060∗∗∗ -1.203∗∗∗ 0.646∗∗∗ 0.003 2.240∗∗∗ -0.581∗∗∗
leisure (female) -0.418∗∗∗ 0.329∗∗∗ 0.050∗∗∗ 0.273∗∗∗ 0.006 0.843∗∗∗ 0.222∗∗∗ 0.204∗∗∗ 1.035∗∗∗ 1.039∗∗∗ 0.773∗∗∗ -0.015∗∗∗
leisure (female)2/100 -0.312∗∗∗ -0.311∗∗∗ -0.128∗∗∗ -0.212∗∗∗ -0.182∗∗∗ -0.283∗∗∗ -0.237∗∗∗ -0.198∗∗∗ -0.175∗∗∗ -0.182∗∗∗ -0.201∗∗∗ -0.187∗∗∗
leisure (female) x age (female)/100 3.245∗∗∗ -0.511∗∗∗ 0.535∗∗∗ -0.371∗∗∗ 1.252∗∗∗ -2.509∗∗∗ -0.003 0.260∗∗∗ -4.358∗∗∗ -3.583∗∗∗ -2.942∗∗∗ 0.968∗∗∗
leisure (female) x age2 (female)/100 -3.308∗∗∗ 1.240∗∗∗ -0.740∗∗∗ 0.440∗∗∗ -1.208∗∗∗ 2.864∗∗∗ 0.471∗∗∗ -0.182∗∗∗ 5.477∗∗∗ 4.222∗∗∗ 3.977∗∗∗ -1.465∗∗∗
leisure (female) x high-skilled (female)/100 2.531∗∗∗ -4.494∗∗∗ -4.678∗∗∗ -3.554∗∗∗ -5.553∗∗∗ -0.220∗∗∗ -2.837∗∗∗ -3.043∗∗∗ -0.353∗∗∗ -8.897∗∗∗ -0.521∗∗∗ 0.652∗∗∗
leisure (female) x unskilled (female)/100 6.665∗∗∗ -4.054∗∗∗ -3.454∗∗∗ 2.024∗∗∗ 1.410∗∗∗ 5.268∗∗∗ 11.637∗∗∗ 11.622∗∗∗ 9.607∗∗∗ -3.595∗∗∗ -4.899∗∗∗ 0.310∗∗∗
leisure (female) x kids 0-2/100 3.644∗∗∗ 3.551∗∗∗ 3.205∗∗∗ 6.572∗∗∗ 5.452∗∗∗ -0.047 15.656∗∗∗ 7.453∗∗∗ 3.678∗∗∗ 5.591∗∗∗ -3.440∗∗∗ 2.222∗∗∗
leisure (female) x kids 3-6/100 13.208∗∗∗ 5.739∗∗∗ 0.818∗∗∗ 4.306∗∗∗ 2.345∗∗∗ 2.300∗∗∗ 5.687∗∗∗ -2.511∗∗∗ 4.465∗∗∗ 8.433∗∗∗ 2.716∗∗∗ 4.753∗∗∗
leisure (female) x kids 7-16/100 4.066∗∗∗ 3.905∗∗∗ 1.389∗∗∗ 3.637∗∗∗ 0.611∗∗∗ 1.107∗∗∗ 2.240∗∗∗ 0.771∗∗∗ 5.577∗∗∗ 8.339∗∗∗ 1.257∗∗∗ -1.179∗∗∗
leisure (female) x married/100 -4.316∗∗∗ -2.277∗∗∗ 2.383∗∗∗ 0.616∗∗∗ -7.645∗∗∗ 2.089∗∗∗ -4.551∗∗∗ -1.047∗∗∗ -1.503∗∗∗ -8.651∗∗∗ -1.506∗∗∗ 11.232∗∗∗
leisure (female) x handicap (female)/100 -22.501∗∗∗ -3.285∗∗∗ -0.678∗∗∗ -7.993∗∗∗ -8.657∗∗∗ -1.226∗∗∗ -9.863∗∗∗ 3.027∗∗∗ -1.779∗∗∗ 0.543∗∗∗ 3.282∗∗∗
leisure (female) x care/100 -124.542∗∗∗ -21.812∗∗∗ 0.215 22.555∗∗∗ -4.025∗∗∗ 61.578∗∗∗ -6.973∗∗∗ -12.134∗∗∗ 12.170∗∗∗ 4.630∗∗∗ 66.124∗∗∗ -17.213∗∗∗
fixed costs (female) -2.449∗∗∗ -2.228∗∗∗ -1.229∗∗∗ -2.254∗∗∗ -1.668∗∗∗ -2.761∗∗∗ -1.557∗∗∗ -0.580∗∗∗ -0.723∗∗∗ -0.704∗∗∗ -1.406∗∗∗ -2.085∗∗∗
part-time 20h (female) 0.609∗∗∗ 0.272∗∗∗ 0.575∗∗∗ 0.718∗∗∗ 0.775∗∗∗ 0.469∗∗∗ 0.006∗ -0.036∗∗∗ 0.461∗∗∗ -0.414∗∗∗ 0.512∗∗∗ 0.823∗∗∗
part-time 40h (female) 1.129∗∗∗ 0.439∗∗∗ 0.799∗∗∗ 0.799∗∗∗ 1.261∗∗∗ 1.052∗∗∗ 0.783∗∗∗ 1.288∗∗∗ 0.776∗∗∗ 0.807∗∗∗ 0.551∗∗∗ 1.167∗∗∗
o.leisure (female) x handicap (female)/100 0.000
Pseudo R2 0.238 0.234 0.143 0.214 0.237 0.263 0.206 0.234 0.205 0.215 0.192 0.228
Observations 11887008 11747792 11496142 10420137 10543246 11602213 10485349 10119711 8588356 9613779 8533448 9088268
Note: This table shows results of the conditional logit estimation described in equation (7) for each year separately. The dependent
variable is the household choice of working time category. Significance levels are indicated as follows: ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗
p < 0.001.
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C.2 Labor Supply Model (East Germany)
Table C.7: Conditional logit regression results (flex. couples, 1996–2010)
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
choice
disp. inc. -0.002∗∗∗ -0.009∗∗∗ -0.011∗∗∗ -0.004∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ -0.007∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ -0.002∗∗∗ -0.008∗∗∗ -0.007∗∗∗ -0.005∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗ -0.002∗∗∗
disp. inc.2/100 -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗
disp. inc. x age (male)/100 0.020∗∗∗ -0.020∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗ 0.052∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ -0.017∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.033∗∗∗ 0.051∗∗∗ 0.041∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗ -0.008∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗
disp. inc. x age2 (male)/100 -0.022∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗ -0.019∗∗∗ -0.057∗∗∗ -0.020∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗ -0.025∗∗∗ -0.004∗∗∗ -0.035∗∗∗ -0.051∗∗∗ -0.043∗∗∗ -0.014∗∗∗ -0.014∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗ -0.021∗∗∗
disp. inc. x age (female)/100 -0.024∗∗∗ 0.070∗∗∗ 0.052∗∗∗ -0.023∗∗∗ -0.012∗∗∗ -0.021∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗ -0.006∗∗∗ -0.028∗∗∗ -0.015∗∗∗ -0.012∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗ -0.026∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗
disp. inc. x age2 (female)/100 0.030∗∗∗ -0.070∗∗∗ -0.058∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗ -0.012∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.037∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗ -0.014∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗ -0.011∗∗∗ -0.020∗∗∗
disp. inc. x high-skilled (male)/100 -0.039∗∗∗ -0.028∗∗∗ 0.037∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.136∗∗∗ 0.092∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗ 0.118∗∗∗ -0.054∗∗∗ -0.025∗∗∗ -0.044∗∗∗ 0.114∗∗∗
disp. inc. x unskilled (male)/100 -0.015∗∗∗ 0.068∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗ 0.246∗∗∗ 0.090∗∗∗ -0.019∗∗∗ -0.067∗∗∗ -0.056∗∗∗ -0.172∗∗∗ -0.263∗∗∗ -0.001 0.009∗∗∗ 0.049∗∗∗ 0.057∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗
disp. inc. x high-skilled (female)/100 0.017∗∗∗ -0.001 -0.042∗∗∗ 0.001 -0.026∗∗∗ -0.020∗∗∗ 0.034∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗ -0.045∗∗∗ -0.029∗∗∗ -0.069∗∗∗ -0.025∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.046∗∗∗
disp. inc. x unskilled (female)/100 -0.213∗∗∗ 0.221∗∗∗ -0.103∗∗∗ 0.182∗∗∗ 0.164∗∗∗ 0.380∗∗∗ -0.178∗∗∗ 0.151∗∗∗ 0.147∗∗∗ -0.164∗∗∗ 0.063∗∗∗ -0.267∗∗∗ -0.143∗∗∗ -0.053∗∗∗ -0.481∗∗∗
disp. inc. x kids 0-2/100 0.050∗∗∗ -0.177∗∗∗ 0.066∗∗∗ 0.255∗∗∗ 0.063∗∗∗ 0.079∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ -0.043∗∗∗ -0.137∗∗∗ -0.058∗∗∗ -0.109∗∗∗ 0.001 -0.025∗∗∗ -0.012∗∗∗ 0.187∗∗∗
disp. inc. x kids 3-6/100 0.006∗∗∗ -0.001 0.085∗∗∗ -0.028∗∗∗ -0.141∗∗∗ -0.058∗∗∗ -0.010∗∗∗ -0.000 0.084∗∗∗ -0.011∗∗∗ -0.055∗∗∗ -0.031∗∗∗ -0.083∗∗∗ 0.049∗∗∗ -0.118∗∗∗
disp. inc. x kids 7-16/100 0.035∗∗∗ 0.036∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗ -0.071∗∗∗ -0.034∗∗∗ -0.001 -0.029∗∗∗ -0.007∗∗∗ -0.010∗∗∗ -0.001∗ -0.003∗∗∗ -0.028∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗ -0.006∗∗∗ -0.019∗∗∗
disp. inc. x married/100 0.288∗∗∗ -0.082∗∗∗ -0.134∗∗∗ -0.049∗∗∗ -0.173∗∗∗ 0.207∗∗∗ -0.000 -0.113∗∗∗ 0.070∗∗∗ 0.065∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗ -0.022∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗ 0.093∗∗∗
o.disp. inc. x care/100 0.000 0.037∗∗∗ -0.144∗∗∗ 0.000 0.483∗∗∗ -0.237∗∗∗ -0.112∗∗∗ 0.086∗∗∗ 0.127∗∗∗ -0.003 -0.209∗∗∗ -0.038∗∗∗ -0.029∗∗∗ -0.104∗∗∗ 0.820∗∗∗
leisure (male) 0.688∗∗∗ 0.521∗∗∗ 0.604∗∗∗ 0.504∗∗∗ 1.062∗∗∗ 0.651∗∗∗ 0.274∗∗∗ 0.603∗∗∗ 0.281∗∗∗ 0.211∗∗∗ 0.107∗∗∗ -0.064∗∗∗ 0.699∗∗∗ 0.515∗∗∗ 0.081∗∗∗
leisure (female) 0.459∗∗∗ 0.210∗∗∗ -0.042∗∗∗ 0.135∗∗∗ 0.413∗∗∗ 0.260∗∗∗ -0.006∗ 0.529∗∗∗ 0.059∗∗∗ 0.280∗∗∗ 0.301∗∗∗ 0.093∗∗∗ 0.192∗∗∗ 0.611∗∗∗ 0.177∗∗∗
leisure (male)2/100 -1.000∗∗∗ -0.848∗∗∗ -1.193∗∗∗ -0.724∗∗∗ -1.250∗∗∗ -1.000∗∗∗ -0.852∗∗∗ -0.891∗∗∗ -0.686∗∗∗ -0.590∗∗∗ -0.820∗∗∗ -0.434∗∗∗ -0.882∗∗∗ -0.824∗∗∗ -0.594∗∗∗
leisure (female)2/100 -0.403∗∗∗ -0.297∗∗∗ -0.323∗∗∗ -0.367∗∗∗ -0.339∗∗∗ -0.288∗∗∗ -0.426∗∗∗ -0.404∗∗∗ -0.285∗∗∗ -0.204∗∗∗ -0.392∗∗∗ -0.291∗∗∗ -0.256∗∗∗ -0.361∗∗∗ -0.255∗∗∗
leisure (male) x age (male)/100 -0.880∗∗∗ -0.141∗∗∗ 0.714∗∗∗ -0.122∗∗∗ -1.252∗∗∗ -0.127∗∗∗ 1.331∗∗∗ 0.163∗∗∗ 0.575∗∗∗ 0.706∗∗∗ 2.016∗∗∗ 1.436∗∗∗ -0.861∗∗∗ 0.009 1.291∗∗∗
leisure (male) x age2 (male)/100 1.269∗∗∗ 0.466∗∗∗ -0.650∗∗∗ 0.242∗∗∗ 1.640∗∗∗ 0.202∗∗∗ -1.243∗∗∗ -0.120∗∗∗ -0.309∗∗∗ -0.585∗∗∗ -1.896∗∗∗ -1.324∗∗∗ 1.443∗∗∗ 0.257∗∗∗ -1.239∗∗∗
leisure (male) x high-skilled (male)/100 -4.226∗∗∗ -5.956∗∗∗ -2.111∗∗∗ -1.423∗∗∗ -2.066∗∗∗ 1.646∗∗∗ -1.720∗∗∗ -0.311∗∗∗ 0.811∗∗∗ 2.280∗∗∗ 0.114∗∗∗ -4.992∗∗∗ -2.072∗∗∗ -2.696∗∗∗ 7.780∗∗∗
leisure (male) x unskilled (male)/100 1.330∗∗∗ 0.934∗∗∗ 4.486∗∗∗ 3.688∗∗∗ 3.066∗∗∗ 4.433∗∗∗ 4.019∗∗∗ 3.194∗∗∗ 0.987∗∗∗ 2.656∗∗∗ 6.805∗∗∗ 1.599∗∗∗ 1.391∗∗∗ 6.896∗∗∗ 3.043∗∗∗
leisure (male) x married/100 7.605∗∗∗ -1.966∗∗∗ -3.969∗∗∗ -0.775∗∗∗ -3.183∗∗∗ 2.502∗∗∗ -4.982∗∗∗ -4.325∗∗∗ -0.850∗∗∗ -0.752∗∗∗ -4.374∗∗∗ -1.474∗∗∗ -2.170∗∗∗ 0.228∗∗∗ 1.508∗∗∗
leisure (male) x handicap (male)/100 1.069∗∗∗ 2.512∗∗∗ 3.461∗∗∗ 5.636∗∗∗ 3.393∗∗∗ 3.612∗∗∗ -0.756∗∗∗ 0.855∗∗∗ 6.379∗∗∗ 0.383∗∗∗ 2.208∗∗∗ 8.579∗∗∗ 5.410∗∗∗ -6.986∗∗∗ -1.920∗∗∗
leisure (female) x age (female)/100 -1.234∗∗∗ -0.153∗∗∗ 1.415∗∗∗ 0.850∗∗∗ -0.538∗∗∗ -0.422∗∗∗ 1.613∗∗∗ -0.864∗∗∗ 0.507∗∗∗ -0.487∗∗∗ -0.121∗∗∗ 0.784∗∗∗ 0.182∗∗∗ -1.629∗∗∗ 0.330∗∗∗
leisure (female) x age2 (female)/100 1.539∗∗∗ 0.541∗∗∗ -1.425∗∗∗ -0.813∗∗∗ 0.839∗∗∗ 0.795∗∗∗ -1.550∗∗∗ 1.367∗∗∗ -0.111∗∗∗ 0.637∗∗∗ 0.640∗∗∗ -0.689∗∗∗ -0.083∗∗∗ 2.256∗∗∗ -0.359∗∗∗
leisure (female) x high-skilled (female)/100 -3.994∗∗∗ -4.047∗∗∗ -3.861∗∗∗ -1.212∗∗∗ -2.148∗∗∗ -4.152∗∗∗ -1.608∗∗∗ -5.333∗∗∗ -2.118∗∗∗ -3.625∗∗∗ -5.384∗∗∗ -5.008∗∗∗ -4.117∗∗∗ -5.921∗∗∗ -1.401∗∗∗
leisure (female) x unskilled (female)/100 8.384∗∗∗ 19.468∗∗∗ 1.880∗∗∗ 12.306∗∗∗ 10.612∗∗∗ 7.921∗∗∗ 0.055 2.720∗∗∗ 6.641∗∗∗ -5.266∗∗∗ 7.720∗∗∗ 7.445∗∗∗ 3.445∗∗∗ 1.246∗∗∗ -7.178∗∗∗
leisure (female) x kids 0-2/100 9.351∗∗∗ 7.984∗∗∗ 4.401∗∗∗ 16.342∗∗∗ -0.418∗∗∗ 8.861∗∗∗ 6.500∗∗∗ 8.254∗∗∗ 7.268∗∗∗ 7.266∗∗∗ 6.043∗∗∗ 4.340∗∗∗ 6.195∗∗∗ 1.513∗∗∗ 12.020∗∗∗
leisure (female) x kids 3-6/100 3.282∗∗∗ 3.660∗∗∗ 5.264∗∗∗ 2.221∗∗∗ 0.777∗∗∗ 1.198∗∗∗ 2.991∗∗∗ 0.816∗∗∗ 5.249∗∗∗ 0.565∗∗∗ 3.455∗∗∗ 0.975∗∗∗ 1.370∗∗∗ 3.859∗∗∗ -0.821∗∗∗
leisure (female) x kids 7-16/100 2.239∗∗∗ 2.999∗∗∗ 3.322∗∗∗ -0.834∗∗∗ 0.227∗∗∗ 1.927∗∗∗ 0.342∗∗∗ 2.116∗∗∗ 2.101∗∗∗ 0.687∗∗∗ 2.858∗∗∗ 1.070∗∗∗ 1.769∗∗∗ 2.281∗∗∗ 1.579∗∗∗
leisure (female) x married/100 10.275∗∗∗ -0.903∗∗∗ -1.559∗∗∗ 0.515∗∗∗ -3.091∗∗∗ 3.446∗∗∗ -1.884∗∗∗ -4.713∗∗∗ 0.862∗∗∗ 2.271∗∗∗ -0.517∗∗∗ 0.785∗∗∗ 2.005∗∗∗ -0.010 5.706∗∗∗
leisure (female) x handicap (female)/100 7.171∗∗∗ -0.058 4.724∗∗∗ 3.637∗∗∗ 0.745∗∗∗ 2.060∗∗∗ 0.040 0.066 -3.827∗∗∗ 8.902∗∗∗ -0.001 1.294∗∗∗ 0.481∗∗∗ 0.967∗∗∗ -0.899∗∗∗
o.leisure (female) x care/100 0.000 4.741∗∗∗ -8.743∗∗∗ 0.000 193.244 5.235∗∗∗ 2.835∗∗∗ 14.439∗∗∗ 1.059∗∗∗ 6.587∗∗∗ 0.028 6.640∗∗∗ 6.854∗∗∗ -1.160∗∗∗ 210.072
fixed costs (male) -20.936∗∗∗ -18.099∗∗∗ -26.701∗∗∗ -13.682∗∗∗ -27.421∗∗∗ -20.223∗∗∗ -17.004∗∗∗ -17.899∗∗∗ -13.441∗∗∗ -11.390∗∗∗ -15.207∗∗∗ -9.649∗∗∗ -17.949∗∗∗ -15.723∗∗∗ -11.507∗∗∗
part-time 20h (male) -18.491 2.157∗∗∗ 5.498∗∗∗ -20.343 -22.100 -17.660 0.530∗∗∗ -18.546 2.060∗∗∗ -1.032∗∗∗ 2.958∗∗∗ 1.751∗∗∗ 2.553∗∗∗ -0.263∗∗∗ 1.316∗∗∗
part-time 40h (male) 0.774∗∗∗ 1.129∗∗∗ 0.827∗∗∗ 0.412∗∗∗ 0.827∗∗∗ 0.635∗∗∗ 0.391∗∗∗ 0.678∗∗∗ 0.538∗∗∗ 0.435∗∗∗ 0.263∗∗∗ 1.283∗∗∗ 0.405∗∗∗ 0.500∗∗∗ 0.366∗∗∗
fixed costs (female) -5.969∗∗∗ -4.502∗∗∗ -4.957∗∗∗ -4.884∗∗∗ -5.374∗∗∗ -4.075∗∗∗ -5.631∗∗∗ -4.724∗∗∗ -3.579∗∗∗ -2.724∗∗∗ -4.527∗∗∗ -3.381∗∗∗ -2.118∗∗∗ -4.102∗∗∗ -2.479∗∗∗
part-time 20h (female) 0.050∗∗∗ -0.562∗∗∗ 0.048∗∗∗ -0.273∗∗∗ 0.094∗∗∗ -0.492∗∗∗ -0.210∗∗∗ 0.076∗∗∗ -1.045∗∗∗ -0.329∗∗∗ -0.018∗∗∗ -0.661∗∗∗ -2.112∗∗∗ -0.111∗∗∗ -0.522∗∗∗
part-time 40h (female) 1.125∗∗∗ 1.027∗∗∗ 1.030∗∗∗ 1.267∗∗∗ 1.088∗∗∗ 0.914∗∗∗ 0.726∗∗∗ 0.880∗∗∗ 0.887∗∗∗ 1.171∗∗∗ 0.691∗∗∗ 0.744∗∗∗ 0.688∗∗∗ 0.734∗∗∗ 1.086∗∗∗
Pseudo R2 0.379 0.356 0.352 0.346 0.362 0.346 0.316 0.332 0.278 0.275 0.295 0.285 0.305 0.315 0.281
Observations 97752697 92638812 83917596 86339225 83509475 67908512 72110311 67447569 68623667 66769458 56064036 67637444 72769459 56052423 68905907
Note: This table shows results of the conditional logit estimation described in equation (7) for each year separately. The dependent
variable is the household choice of working time category. Significance levels are indicated as follows: ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗
p < 0.001.
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Table C.8: Conditional logit regression results (semi-flex. couples, male, 1996–2010)
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
disp. inc. -0.058∗∗∗ -0.027∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗ -0.002∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗ 0.048∗∗∗ -0.122∗∗∗ -0.006∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗ -0.004∗∗∗ -0.091∗∗∗ 0.085∗∗∗ -0.003∗∗∗ -0.013∗∗∗ 0.040∗∗∗
disp. inc.2/100 -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗
disp. inc. x age (male)/100 0.191∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.230∗∗∗ -0.026∗∗∗ -0.109∗∗∗ -0.427∗∗∗ 0.539∗∗∗ 0.090∗∗∗ -0.171∗∗∗ 0.095∗∗∗ 0.707∗∗∗ -0.493∗∗∗ 0.006∗ 0.055∗∗∗ -0.219∗∗∗
disp. inc. x age2 (male)/100 -0.292∗∗∗ -0.105∗∗∗ -0.210∗∗∗ 0.063∗∗∗ 0.099∗∗∗ 0.476∗∗∗ -0.591∗∗∗ -0.094∗∗∗ 0.250∗∗∗ -0.125∗∗∗ -0.822∗∗∗ 0.519∗∗∗ -0.001 -0.051∗∗∗ 0.237∗∗∗
disp. inc. x age (female)/100 0.145∗∗∗ 0.218∗∗∗ -0.341∗∗∗ 0.031∗∗∗ -0.059∗∗∗ 0.185∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗ -0.072∗∗∗ 0.078∗∗∗ -0.083∗∗∗ -0.288∗∗∗ 0.110∗∗∗ 0.034∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗ 0.115∗∗∗
disp. inc. x age2 (female)/100 -0.118∗∗∗ -0.221∗∗∗ 0.402∗∗∗ -0.037∗∗∗ 0.117∗∗∗ -0.212∗∗∗ -0.039∗∗∗ 0.081∗∗∗ -0.093∗∗∗ 0.149∗∗∗ 0.376∗∗∗ -0.100∗∗∗ -0.059∗∗∗ -0.032∗∗∗ -0.160∗∗∗
disp. inc. x high-skilled (male)/100 0.102∗∗∗ 0.790∗∗∗ -0.074∗∗∗ -0.081∗∗∗ -1.116∗∗∗ 0.469∗∗∗ 0.909∗∗∗ 0.040∗∗∗ 0.266∗∗∗ -0.217∗∗∗ 0.325∗∗∗ -0.193∗∗∗ 0.006 0.081∗∗∗ 0.208∗∗∗
disp. inc. x unskilled (male)/100 -680.626 2.210∗∗∗ -2.422∗∗∗ 4.448 6.713∗∗∗ -10.176 1247.393 -614.166 0.422∗∗∗ -3146.514 -11.022 -6.632 -5498.268
disp. inc. x high-skilled (female)/100 0.193∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗ 0.581∗∗∗ 0.256∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗ -0.015∗∗∗ 0.161∗∗∗ -0.047∗∗∗ -0.103∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗ -0.130∗∗∗ -0.225∗∗∗ 0.044∗∗∗ -0.053∗∗∗ -0.283∗∗∗
disp. inc. x unskilled (female)/100 56.302 -0.405∗∗∗ 1.031∗∗∗ -0.088∗∗∗ 0.161∗∗∗ 0.154∗∗∗ -0.179∗∗∗ -0.541∗∗∗ -2259.339 -21341.365 -0.093∗∗∗ -0.044∗∗∗
disp. inc. x kids 0-2/100 0.290∗∗∗ 0.720∗∗∗ -0.529∗∗∗ -0.223∗∗∗ 0.136∗∗∗ -0.119∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗ 0.146∗∗∗ -0.089∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗ 0.147∗∗∗ -0.012∗∗∗ -0.091∗∗∗ -0.049∗∗∗
disp. inc. x kids 3-6/100 -0.047∗∗∗ -0.658∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗ -0.127∗∗∗ 0.226∗∗∗ -0.056∗∗∗ -0.275∗∗∗ 0.055∗∗∗ 0.068∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗∗ -0.178∗∗∗ 0.054∗∗∗ -0.075∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗ 1.164∗∗∗
disp. inc. x kids 7-16/100 -0.035∗∗∗ -0.160∗∗∗ 0.341∗∗∗ 0.090∗∗∗ -0.143∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗∗ -0.332∗∗∗ 0.036∗∗∗ 0.032∗∗∗ -0.060∗∗∗ -0.020∗∗∗ -0.299∗∗∗ -0.055∗∗∗ -0.056∗∗∗ -0.160∗∗∗
disp. inc. x married/100 0.336∗∗∗ -0.499∗∗∗ -0.651∗∗∗ 0.034∗∗∗ 0.799∗∗∗ 0.920∗∗∗ 0.156∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗ -1.136∗∗∗ -0.290∗∗∗ 0.080∗∗∗ -0.082∗∗∗ 0.033∗∗∗ 0.035∗∗∗ -0.233∗∗∗
disp. inc. x care/100 -0.285∗∗∗ 0.156∗∗∗ 1.013∗∗∗ 0.168∗∗∗ 6.149∗∗∗ -0.499∗∗∗ -0.046∗∗∗ -0.001 -0.122∗∗∗ 0.861∗∗∗ -0.149∗∗∗ -2.108∗∗∗
leisure (male) -0.225∗∗∗ 0.436∗∗∗ 0.635∗∗∗ -0.009 2.618∗∗∗ 3.508∗∗∗ -0.257∗∗∗ 0.532∗∗∗ 1.988∗∗∗ 1.310∗∗∗ -2.140∗∗∗ 3.277∗∗∗ 0.072∗∗∗ 2.322 2.004∗∗∗
leisure (male)2/100 -0.394∗∗∗ -1.585∗∗∗ -0.957∗∗∗ -0.142∗∗∗ -1.562∗∗∗ -3.967∗∗∗ -4.388∗∗∗ -0.310∗∗∗ -0.769∗∗∗ -1.074∗∗∗ -1.386∗∗∗ -1.136∗∗∗ 0.055∗∗∗ -3.118 -0.401∗∗∗
leisure (male) x age (male)/100 3.062∗∗∗ 3.169∗∗∗ 0.231∗∗∗ -0.319∗∗∗ -8.117∗∗∗ -7.684∗∗∗ 11.340∗∗∗ -1.508∗∗∗ -7.223∗∗∗ -2.796∗∗∗ 15.198∗∗∗ -11.889∗∗∗ -0.557∗∗∗ -3.875∗∗∗ -6.850∗∗∗
leisure (male) x age2 (male)/100 -4.346∗∗∗ -4.120∗∗∗ 0.390∗∗∗ 1.515∗∗∗ 9.422∗∗∗ 9.133∗∗∗ -11.676∗∗∗ 1.877∗∗∗ 10.656∗∗∗ 4.128∗∗∗ -17.099∗∗∗ 13.370∗∗∗ 0.678∗∗∗ 4.939∗∗∗ 6.708∗∗∗
leisure (male) x high-skilled (male)/100 15.168∗∗∗ 24.022∗∗∗ 12.164∗∗∗ -0.291∗∗ -34.297∗∗∗ 9.417∗∗∗ 15.066∗∗∗ -0.439∗∗∗ 6.521∗∗∗ -8.043∗∗∗ 2.955∗∗∗ -5.460∗∗∗ -2.646∗∗∗ -9.501∗∗∗ 5.071∗∗∗
leisure (male) x unskilled (male)/100 -9384.904 37.996∗∗∗ -0.092 -317.965 125.086∗∗∗ 206.965 30937.105 -20744.829 -13.951∗∗∗ -99233.877 197.600 120.063 -33705.868
leisure (male) x married/100 5.725∗∗∗ 8.407∗∗∗ -19.938∗∗∗ -0.783∗∗∗ 17.877∗∗∗ 21.493∗∗∗ 4.340∗∗∗ -2.963∗∗∗ -38.871∗∗∗ -16.216∗∗∗ -7.747∗∗∗ 0.362∗ -0.918∗∗∗ 2.872∗∗∗ 8.545∗∗∗
leisure (male) x handicap (male)/100 -8.366∗∗∗ 10.570∗∗∗ 3.124∗∗∗ 80.340 4.021∗∗∗ -2.159∗∗∗ -1.598∗∗∗ -6.336∗∗∗
fixed costs (male) -3.635∗∗∗ -26.754∗∗∗ -13.664∗∗∗ -1.935∗∗∗ -27.954∗∗∗ -107.438 -114.315 -3.362∗∗∗ -7.447∗∗∗ -17.922∗∗∗ -23.686∗∗∗ -21.301∗∗∗ -1.030∗∗∗ -87.012 19.324
part-time 20h (male) -24.342 6.661∗∗∗ 1.537∗∗∗ -2.586∗∗∗ -20.869 2.929 3.490 -0.079∗∗∗ 1.732∗∗∗ -33.949 -16.174 -27.050 -0.935∗∗∗ 33.891 -22.653
part-time 40h (male) 1.241∗∗∗ 0.862∗∗∗ 0.233∗∗∗ 0.884∗∗∗ 0.619∗∗∗ 6.793∗∗∗ 6.153∗∗∗ -0.110∗∗∗ -0.725∗∗∗ 0.001 -0.170∗∗∗ 0.839∗∗∗ 2.350∗∗∗ 6.527 0.175∗∗∗
Pseudo R2 0.483 0.537 0.455 0.312 0.559 0.507 0.544 0.285 0.366 0.459 0.535 0.515 0.387 0.488 0.462
Observations 2719626 2959159 2457427 3050068 2198798 1465996 1670753 1485645 1596532 2537143 2117430 1574930 1160446 1356152 1067682
Note: This table shows results of the conditional logit estimation described in equation (7) for each year separately. The dependent
variable is the household choice of working time category. Significance levels are indicated as follows: ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗
p < 0.001.
Table C.9: Conditional logit regression results (semi-flex. couples, female, 1996–
2010)
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
disp. inc. 0.009∗∗∗ 0.046∗∗∗ -0.021∗∗∗ -0.008∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗ -0.034∗∗∗ -0.043∗∗∗ -0.066∗∗∗ -0.055∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ -0.030∗∗∗ -0.142∗∗∗ -0.129∗∗∗ 0.073∗∗∗ 0.037∗∗∗
disp. inc.2/100 -0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗
disp. inc. x age (male)/100 -0.046∗∗∗ 0.245∗∗∗ 0.099∗∗∗ -0.248∗∗∗ -0.036∗∗∗ -0.049∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗ 0.076∗∗∗ -0.055∗∗∗ -0.003 0.179∗∗∗ 0.199∗∗∗ 0.152∗∗∗ 0.073∗∗∗ -0.017∗∗∗
disp. inc. x age2 (male)/100 0.039∗∗∗ -0.326∗∗∗ -0.133∗∗∗ 0.312∗∗∗ 0.064∗∗∗ 0.034∗∗∗ -0.023∗∗∗ -0.112∗∗∗ 0.033∗∗∗ -0.038∗∗∗ -0.192∗∗∗ -0.238∗∗∗ -0.121∗∗∗ -0.073∗∗∗ 0.001
disp. inc. x age (female)/100 0.019∗∗∗ -0.503∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗ 0.250∗∗∗ -0.010∗∗∗ 0.288∗∗∗ 0.184∗∗∗ 0.234∗∗∗ 0.346∗∗∗ -0.012∗∗∗ -0.007∗∗∗ 0.513∗∗∗ 0.524∗∗∗ -0.364∗∗∗ -0.117∗∗∗
disp. inc. x age2 (female)/100 -0.003 0.564∗∗∗ -0.003 -0.376∗∗∗ -0.020∗∗∗ -0.317∗∗∗ -0.215∗∗∗ -0.215∗∗∗ -0.356∗∗∗ 0.049∗∗∗ 0.001 -0.596∗∗∗ -0.652∗∗∗ 0.372∗∗∗ 0.114∗∗∗
disp. inc. x high-skilled (male)/100 -0.035∗∗∗ -0.116∗∗∗ -0.057∗∗∗ -0.027∗∗∗ 0.155∗∗∗ 0.113∗∗∗ -0.046∗∗∗ -0.003∗ 0.043∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗ -0.084∗∗∗ 0.356∗∗∗ 0.060∗∗∗ 0.401∗∗∗ 0.128∗∗∗
o.disp. inc. x unskilled (male)/100 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -11.497 -5.902 -21.445 0.025∗∗∗ -18.362 0.654∗∗∗ -9.207 -8.743 -0.154∗∗∗
disp. inc. x high-skilled (female)/100 0.034∗∗∗ -0.255∗∗∗ 0.096∗∗∗ 0.083∗∗∗ -0.016∗∗∗ 0.284∗∗∗ 0.401∗∗∗ -0.149∗∗∗ -0.034∗∗∗ -0.066∗∗∗ -0.234∗∗∗ -0.045∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗ 0.057∗∗∗ 0.167∗∗∗
disp. inc. x unskilled (female)/100 -5.847 -6.943 2.318∗∗∗ -0.050∗∗∗ -484.366∗∗∗ 0.396∗∗∗ -2027.335 34832.216 0.065 -1279.593 5.203∗∗∗ -0.127∗∗∗ 4.092∗∗∗ -5.384
o.disp. inc. x kids 0-2/100 0.000 0.000 0.000 -5.982 -0.141∗∗∗ -0.345∗∗∗ -8.104∗∗∗ 0.884∗∗∗ 0.210∗∗∗ -0.029 -0.455∗∗∗ 9.068∗∗∗ -380.107 -0.666∗∗∗ -0.351∗∗∗
disp. inc. x kids 3-6/100 -0.068∗∗∗ -4.137∗∗∗ -0.186∗∗∗ -0.031∗∗∗ -0.047∗∗ 0.221∗∗∗ 0.089∗∗∗ -0.803∗∗∗ 0.050∗∗∗ 0.056∗∗∗ -0.157∗∗∗ 0.484∗∗∗ -0.898∗∗∗ -0.425∗∗∗ -0.144∗∗∗
disp. inc. x kids 7-16/100 0.043∗∗∗ 0.109∗∗∗ -0.052∗∗∗ 0.070∗∗∗ 0.047∗∗∗ -0.171∗∗∗ -0.293∗∗∗ 0.456∗∗∗ 0.167∗∗∗ 0.036∗∗∗ -0.192∗∗∗ -0.421∗∗∗ -1.391∗∗∗ -0.344∗∗∗ -0.051∗∗∗
disp. inc. x married/100 -0.054∗∗∗ 1.831∗∗∗ -0.008 1.149∗∗∗ -0.060∗∗∗ -1.143∗∗∗ 0.176∗∗∗ -0.642∗∗∗ -0.477∗∗∗ -0.040∗∗∗ -0.056∗∗∗ -0.061∗∗∗ -0.395∗∗∗ 0.080∗∗∗ 0.088∗∗∗
disp. inc. x care/100 0.113 -7.173 0.296∗∗∗ -0.292∗∗∗ -644.066 -10.251 -0.429∗∗∗ -875.345 0.695∗∗∗ 0.111∗∗∗
leisure (female) 0.222∗∗∗ 5.605∗∗∗ 0.064∗∗∗ 0.248∗∗∗ 0.581∗∗∗ -0.634∗∗∗ -0.116∗∗∗ -1.310∗∗∗ -1.566∗∗∗ 0.570∗∗∗ 0.423∗∗∗ -2.691∗∗∗ -1.887∗∗∗ 0.483∗∗∗ 0.234∗∗∗
leisure (female)2/100 -0.413∗∗∗ -1.003∗∗∗ -0.334∗∗∗ -1.006∗∗∗ -0.427∗∗∗ -0.595∗∗∗ -0.503∗∗∗ -0.642∗∗∗ -0.441∗∗∗ -0.806∗∗∗ -0.487∗∗∗ -0.613∗∗∗ -1.884∗∗∗ -0.597∗∗∗ -0.776∗∗∗
leisure (female) x age (female)/100 1.090∗∗∗ -24.838∗∗∗ 1.002∗∗∗ 0.882∗∗∗ -1.679∗∗∗ 6.743∗∗∗ 2.460∗∗∗ 8.663∗∗∗ 9.258∗∗∗ 0.699∗∗∗ 0.758∗∗∗ 15.739∗∗∗ 17.431∗∗∗ 1.733∗∗∗ 1.609∗∗∗
leisure (female) x age2 (female)/100 -1.343∗∗∗ 26.468∗∗∗ -0.853∗∗∗ -1.777∗∗∗ 2.179∗∗∗ -7.746∗∗∗ -2.732∗∗∗ -9.011∗∗∗ -9.879∗∗∗ -0.762∗∗∗ -0.644∗∗∗ -18.192∗∗∗ -20.285∗∗∗ -2.624∗∗∗ -1.323∗∗∗
leisure (female) x high-skilled (female)/100 -3.156∗∗∗ -9.864∗∗∗ -5.770∗∗∗ -14.439∗∗∗ -1.587∗∗∗ 9.701∗∗∗ 11.170∗∗∗ -10.071∗∗∗ -3.900∗∗∗ 1.275∗∗∗ -3.822∗∗∗ -5.996∗∗∗ 9.594∗∗∗ 1.468∗∗∗ -4.974∗∗∗
leisure (female) x unskilled (female)/100 254.085 285.373 46.125∗∗∗ -4.026∗∗∗ -4414.218∗∗∗ 10.413∗∗∗ -45015.628 871676.747 -6.741 -20918.610 82.415∗∗∗ 6.302∗∗∗ 157.665∗∗∗ 227.656
o.leisure (female) x kids 0-2/100 0.000 0.000 -2.201∗∗∗ 411.442 18.001∗∗∗ -0.828∗∗∗ -59.515∗∗∗ 29.306∗∗∗ 9.351∗∗∗ 1.126∗∗∗ -20.982∗∗∗ 198.914∗∗∗ -8544.682 -26.344∗∗∗ 22.081∗∗∗
leisure (female) x kids 3-6/100 5.720∗∗∗ -107.161∗∗∗ 11.931∗∗∗ 20.376∗∗∗ -2.400∗∗∗ 9.375∗∗∗ 8.932∗∗∗ -17.578∗∗∗ 7.802∗∗∗ -2.274∗∗∗ -6.120∗∗∗ 12.303∗∗∗ -16.214∗∗∗ 13.526∗∗∗ 5.055∗∗∗
leisure (female) x kids 7-16/100 -0.832∗∗∗ 14.161∗∗∗ 0.493∗∗∗ 3.141∗∗∗ 1.065∗∗∗ -2.145∗∗∗ -3.768∗∗∗ 14.881∗∗∗ 4.472∗∗∗ 0.001 -6.339∗∗∗ -5.873∗∗∗ -37.659∗∗∗ -18.984∗∗∗ 2.042∗∗∗
leisure (female) x married/100 -3.225∗∗∗ 82.441∗∗∗ 0.942∗ 55.795∗∗∗ 5.488∗∗∗ -31.191∗∗∗ 2.653∗∗∗ -13.334∗∗∗ -8.674∗∗∗ -0.357∗∗ -6.145∗∗∗ 5.245∗∗∗ 24.001∗∗∗ -1.831∗∗∗ 0.400∗
leisure (female) x handicap (female)/100 -0.268 -1.296∗∗∗ 0.306 -10960.544 1.531∗∗∗ 0.547∗∗∗ 1.779∗∗∗ -3.723∗∗∗ 1.381∗∗∗
leisure (female) x care/100 -14.102 262.081 12.759∗∗∗ -7.323∗∗∗ -28045.498 185.808 -10.302∗∗∗ -15450.084 0.840 -1.074∗∗∗
fixed costs (female) -4.919∗∗∗ -6.734∗∗∗ -2.974∗∗∗ -8.420∗∗∗ -4.091∗∗∗ -7.742∗∗∗ -5.407∗∗∗ -5.233∗∗∗ -4.577∗∗∗ -8.106∗∗∗ -4.131∗∗∗ -4.412∗∗∗ -20.188∗∗∗ -3.403∗∗∗ -7.536∗∗∗
part-time 20h (female) 0.221∗∗∗ -0.187∗∗∗ -2.977∗∗∗ -13.914 1.616∗∗∗ -0.603∗∗∗ -0.379∗∗∗ -0.431∗∗∗ -0.314∗∗∗ 0.088∗∗∗ -0.400∗∗∗ -1.809∗∗∗ 0.493∗∗∗ -0.935∗∗∗ -0.430∗∗∗
part-time 40h (female) 1.186∗∗∗ 0.367∗∗∗ 1.569∗∗∗ 0.666∗∗∗ 0.818∗∗∗ 0.608∗∗∗ 0.511∗∗∗ 0.374∗∗∗ 0.254∗∗∗ -0.047∗∗∗ 0.907∗∗∗ 1.448∗∗∗ -0.233∗∗∗ 1.599∗∗∗ 0.954∗∗∗
Pseudo R2 0.319 0.471 0.392 0.538 0.289 0.394 0.369 0.355 0.316 0.348 0.389 0.507 0.596 0.523 0.473
Observations 2245964 1567860 2043006 2233735 2179856 2464049 2199848 2497313 2488542 2498139 2316370 2126915 2325043 3127173 2178813
Note: This table shows results of the conditional logit estimation described in equation (7) for each year separately. The dependent
variable is the household choice of working time category. Significance levels are indicated as follows: ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗
p < 0.001.
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C.3 Tax-Benefit System
Table C.10: Tax-benefit regression results (1986–1998)
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
total gross inc. 0.605∗∗∗ 0.362∗∗∗ 0.387∗∗∗ 0.339∗∗ 0.369∗∗∗ 0.295∗∗ 0.119 0.286∗∗ 0.151 0.383∗∗∗ 0.470∗∗∗ 0.492∗∗∗ 0.123
total gross inc.2/100 -0.002 0.002 0.004∗ 0.002 -0.000 0.001 0.005∗∗∗ 0.002 0.004∗ 0.002 -0.002 0.001 0.004∗
total gross inc.3/1000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000∗ -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000 -0.000 -0.000∗ 0.000 -0.000∗ -0.000∗
total gross inc. x married -0.238∗ -0.000 -0.123 -0.050 0.097 0.194∗ 0.189∗ 0.086 0.067 0.017 -0.125 -0.067 0.273∗∗
total gross inc. x kids 0-2 -0.349∗∗∗ -0.140∗ 0.078 0.173 0.056 -0.187∗ -0.271∗∗ -0.065 0.030 0.062 -0.094 0.012 -0.108
total gross inc. x kids 3-6 0.047 -0.053 0.026 0.009 -0.050 0.026 0.157∗∗ 0.060 0.112 -0.082 -0.130∗∗ -0.056 -0.190∗∗
total gross inc. x kids 7-16 -0.047∗ -0.057∗∗ -0.034 0.021 -0.035 0.014 -0.002 -0.018 0.064∗ 0.005 -0.066∗ -0.051 -0.073∗
total gross inc. x kids 17-25 0.086∗∗∗ 0.118∗∗∗ 0.198∗∗∗ 0.118∗∗∗ 0.090∗∗∗ 0.053∗ 0.063∗∗ 0.065∗∗ 0.062∗ 0.084∗∗∗ 0.088∗∗∗ 0.026 0.017
total gross inc.2/100 x married 0.003 -0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.004∗∗∗ -0.001 0.000 -0.002 0.002∗ -0.001 -0.003∗
total gross inc.2/100 x kids 0-2 0.005∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗ -0.001 -0.002 -0.000 0.001 0.007∗∗∗ -0.000 -0.001 -0.002 0.002 -0.002 0.001
total gross inc.2/100 x kids 3-6 -0.001 0.002 -0.000 -0.000 0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.002∗ 0.001 0.001∗ -0.001 0.003∗∗
total gross inc.2/100 x kids 7-16 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗ 0.001 -0.000 0.001∗∗∗ 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001∗ 0.000 0.001∗∗∗ 0.000 0.001
total gross inc.2/100 x kids 17-25 -0.001∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗ -0.002∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗ -0.000 0.000 0.001∗ -0.001 -0.001∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗ -0.000 0.000 0.000
total gross inc.3/1000 x married -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000∗ 0.000 0.000 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000 -0.000 0.000∗ -0.000 0.000 0.000
total gross inc.3/1000 x kids 0-2 -0.000∗ -0.000∗ 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000∗∗∗ 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000
total gross inc.3/1000 x kids 3-6 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000∗ -0.000 -0.000 0.000∗ -0.000∗∗
total gross inc.3/1000 x kids 7-16 -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000 -0.000∗ -0.000 0.000∗∗ -0.000 -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000 -0.000
total gross inc.3/1000 x kids 17-25 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ -0.000 -0.000∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
labor inc. (male) -0.185 -0.001 -0.142 -0.003 0.044 0.166 0.072 0.088 0.085 -0.113 -0.125 -0.319∗∗∗ -0.067
labor inc. (female) -0.216 -0.207 -0.111 0.052 0.151 0.110 0.043 -0.052 0.207 -0.044 -0.416∗∗ -0.293∗ 0.089
labor inc. (male)2/100 0.003∗ 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 -0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.002∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.002
labor inc. (male)3/1000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ 0.000
labor inc. (female)2/100 0.004 0.015 0.000 -0.003 -0.001 0.002 0.002 0.004 -0.005 0.003 0.024∗∗∗ 0.008 0.000
labor inc. (female)3/1000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000 0.000
labor inc. (male) x married 0.100 -0.042 0.137 -0.006 -0.070 -0.231∗ -0.134 -0.158 -0.148 0.034 -0.000 0.056 -0.211
labor inc. (male) x kids 0-2 0.377∗∗∗ 0.158∗ -0.063 -0.104 -0.044 0.269∗∗ 0.265∗∗∗ 0.215∗∗ 0.153∗ 0.087 0.133 0.060 0.158
labor inc. (male) x kids 3-6 -0.006 0.062 0.036 0.026 0.054 0.008 -0.201∗∗∗ -0.059 -0.085 0.085 0.172∗∗∗ 0.118∗ 0.224∗∗∗
labor inc. (male) x kids 7-16 0.092∗∗∗ 0.122∗∗∗ 0.093∗∗∗ 0.042 0.069∗∗∗ 0.034 0.054∗∗ 0.070∗∗∗ -0.023 0.019 0.098∗∗∗ 0.121∗∗∗ 0.109∗∗∗
labor inc. (male) x kids 17-25 0.027 -0.017 -0.091∗∗∗ -0.020 -0.041∗ 0.025 -0.037 0.033 0.064∗ -0.006 0.017 0.062∗ 0.094∗
labor inc. (female) x married 0.317 0.310 0.213 0.020 -0.127 -0.046 0.031 0.102 -0.130 0.079 0.486∗∗∗ 0.274∗ -0.142
labor inc. (female) x kids 0-2 0.281∗∗ -0.069 0.059 0.107 0.090 0.174∗ 0.113 0.080 -0.144 -0.042 0.145 0.208∗ 0.032
labor inc. (female) x kids 3-6 -0.026 0.012 -0.085 -0.002 0.149∗∗ 0.096 0.024 0.116 0.067 0.078 0.017 0.037 -0.098
labor inc. (female) x kids 7-16 -0.018 -0.010 -0.055 -0.053 -0.021 -0.057∗ -0.047 -0.032 -0.010 0.024 -0.001 0.043 0.101∗∗∗
labor inc. (female) x kids 17-25 -0.038 -0.123∗∗∗ -0.029 0.006 -0.027 -0.030 0.027 0.028 0.031 -0.064∗ -0.100∗∗ -0.021 -0.007
labor inc. (male)2/100 x married -0.001 0.000 -0.000 0.001 0.001 0.003∗∗ 0.002 0.004 0.002∗ -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 0.002
labor inc. (male)2/100 x kids 0-2 -0.004∗∗∗ -0.002∗∗ 0.002 0.001 0.001 -0.002∗ -0.004∗∗∗ -0.002∗ -0.002∗∗ -0.001 -0.001 0.002 -0.000
labor inc. (male)2/100 x kids 3-6 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.003∗∗∗ 0.001 0.002∗ -0.000 -0.002∗∗ -0.001 -0.002∗∗
labor inc. (male)2/100 x kids 7-16 -0.001∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗ -0.000 -0.001∗∗∗ -0.000 -0.001∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗ 0.000 -0.001∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗ -0.001∗
labor inc. (male)2/100 x kids 17-25 -0.001∗ 0.000 0.001∗∗∗ -0.000 0.000 -0.001∗∗ 0.000 -0.001∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗ -0.000 -0.001∗ -0.001∗∗ -0.002∗∗∗
labor inc. (male)3/1000 x married 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000∗ 0.000 -0.000
labor inc. (male)3/1000 x kids 0-2 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗ -0.000∗∗ -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000 0.000∗ 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000
labor inc. (male)3/1000 x kids 3-6 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000 -0.000∗∗ -0.000 0.000∗∗ 0.000 0.000
labor inc. (male)3/1000 x kids 7-16 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗ 0.000 0.000 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗ -0.000 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗ 0.000
labor inc. (male)3/1000 x kids 17-25 0.000∗ -0.000∗ -0.000∗∗∗ 0.000 0.000 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗ -0.000 0.000∗ 0.000∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗
labor inc. (female)2/100 x married -0.005 -0.016 -0.001 0.002 0.004 -0.003 -0.002 -0.004 0.005 -0.002 -0.024∗∗∗ -0.007 0.003
labor inc. (female)2/100 x kids 0-2 -0.013 0.004 -0.004 -0.012∗ -0.008 -0.002 -0.006 -0.007 0.011 0.003 -0.006∗ -0.008∗ 0.008
labor inc. (female)2/100 x kids 3-6 0.004∗∗ 0.001 0.007∗∗∗ 0.003 -0.006∗∗ -0.004 -0.001 -0.006∗∗ -0.002 -0.000 0.003 0.003 0.005∗∗
labor inc. (female)2/100 x kids 7-16 0.001 0.002 0.003 0.005∗∗ 0.001 0.003∗∗ 0.002 0.003∗∗ 0.001 0.000 0.001 -0.000 -0.002∗∗
labor inc. (female)2/100 x kids 17-25 0.002 0.005∗∗∗ -0.000 -0.002 -0.001 0.001 -0.005∗ -0.003 -0.005 0.001 0.002 -0.001 -0.001
labor inc. (female)3/1000 x married -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000 -0.000
labor inc. (female)3/1000 x kids 0-2 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000∗ 0.000 -0.000 0.000∗ 0.000∗ -0.000 -0.000 0.000∗ 0.000 -0.000
labor inc. (female)3/1000 x kids 3-6 -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000 -0.000∗∗ -0.000 0.000∗ 0.000 0.000 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000 0.000 -0.000∗ -0.000∗∗ -0.000∗∗
labor inc. (female)3/1000 x kids 7-16 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000∗∗ -0.000 -0.000∗∗ -0.000 -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000∗
labor inc. (female)3/1000 x kids 17-25 -0.000 -0.000∗∗∗ 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000∗∗ 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000
asset inc. 0.699 0.731 1.802∗∗∗ 1.403 1.620 1.082∗ 0.598∗ 0.799 1.596∗∗ 0.953∗∗ 0.901∗∗∗ 1.485∗∗∗ 0.931
asset inc.2/100 0.032 0.347 -0.144∗∗∗ -0.084 -0.197 -0.080 -0.018 -0.016 -0.176 -0.047 -0.016 -0.125∗∗ -0.029
asset inc.3/1000 -0.000 -0.004 0.000∗∗ -0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000∗∗∗ -0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000
asset inc. x married -0.011 0.506 -1.074∗ -0.712 -1.191 -0.331 -0.126 -0.146 -0.564 -0.245 0.592∗ -0.776∗ -0.181
asset inc. x kids 0-2 0.807 0.300 1.821∗ 0.290 0.161 1.004∗ 0.986∗∗ -0.310 -0.244 0.092 -1.251∗ -0.054 0.968
asset inc. x kids 3-6 -0.017 -0.423 -0.301 0.229 0.210 0.253 0.203 -0.002 -0.105 0.068 -0.196 0.264 -0.573
asset inc. x kids 7-16 -0.162∗ -0.337∗∗∗ -0.108 -0.093 -0.199∗ -0.334∗∗∗ 0.028 -0.066 -0.286∗∗∗ -0.141 -0.437∗∗∗ -0.266∗∗ -0.208∗∗
asset inc. x kids 17-25 -0.239∗∗∗ -0.678∗∗∗ -0.296∗∗∗ -0.047 0.227∗ -0.102 -0.059 0.188 0.145 0.404∗∗ -0.467∗∗ -0.116 0.353∗∗
asset inc.2/100 x married -0.057 -0.430 0.124∗∗ 0.050 0.195 0.035 0.013 -0.003 0.128 0.025 -0.088∗∗∗ 0.111∗∗ 0.015
asset inc.2/100 x kids 0-2 -0.191 -0.076 -0.594 -0.094 0.015 -0.189 -0.224∗∗∗ 0.049 0.035 -0.143 0.229 -0.040 -0.304∗
asset inc.2/100 x kids 3-6 -0.016 0.053 0.030∗ -0.045 -0.032 -0.034 -0.027 0.001 0.001 -0.014 -0.002 -0.013 0.071
asset inc.2/100 x kids 7-16 0.008∗ 0.026∗∗∗ -0.000 0.003 0.015∗∗ 0.038∗∗∗ -0.005 0.002 0.021∗∗ 0.012 0.048∗∗∗ 0.016 0.007∗∗
asset inc.2/100 x kids 17-25 0.011∗∗∗ 0.064∗∗∗ 0.012∗ 0.000 -0.021∗∗ 0.010 -0.003 -0.030∗∗ -0.027∗∗ -0.053∗∗∗ 0.052∗∗ 0.002 -0.018∗∗
asset inc.3/1000 x married 0.000 0.004 -0.000∗∗ 0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000∗∗ 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000
asset inc.3/1000 x kids 0-2 0.001∗ 0.000 0.004 0.000 -0.000 0.001∗ 0.001∗∗∗ -0.000 -0.000 0.002 -0.001 0.000 0.001∗
asset inc.3/1000 x kids 3-6 0.000 -0.000 -0.000∗ 0.000 0.000∗ 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000∗ 0.000 0.000 0.000
asset inc.3/1000 x kids 7-16 -0.000 -0.000∗∗ 0.000 -0.000 -0.000∗ -0.000∗∗∗ 0.000 -0.000 -0.000∗ -0.000 -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000 -0.000∗∗
asset inc.3/1000 x kids 17-25 -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000 0.000 0.000∗∗ -0.000∗ 0.000 0.000∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000 0.000∗∗
Constant 989.776∗∗∗ 1002.039∗∗∗ 1074.446∗∗∗ 1128.059∗∗∗ 932.795∗∗∗ 856.369∗∗∗ 1277.585∗∗∗ 1128.120∗∗∗ 1264.974∗∗∗ 1066.486∗∗∗ 1247.168∗∗∗ 1357.868∗∗∗ 1544.352∗∗∗
R2 0.969 0.965 0.960 0.954 0.967 0.974 0.971 0.972 0.970 0.964 0.966 0.956 0.955
Observations 2475 2411 2276 2154 2073 2068 2029 2015 2009 2198 2144 2117 1985
Note: This table shows results of the tax benefit regression described in equation (8) for each year separately. The dependent
variable is household disposable income. Significance levels are indicated as follows: ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
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Table C.11: Tax-benefit regression results (1999–2010)
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
total gross inc. 0.101 -0.037 0.139∗ 0.157∗∗ 0.176∗∗∗ 0.279∗∗∗ 0.256∗∗∗ 0.233∗∗∗ 0.128∗∗ 0.186∗∗∗ 0.287∗∗∗ 0.249∗∗∗
total gross inc.2/100 0.003∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗ 0.002∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.000 0.000 0.001∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.001 0.001∗
total gross inc.3/1000 -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗ -0.000∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000 -0.000
total gross inc. x married 0.234∗∗ 0.238∗∗ 0.063 0.169∗∗ 0.011 -0.025 -0.027 -0.042 -0.032 0.066 -0.030 0.049
total gross inc. x kids 0-2 0.004 -0.093 0.014 0.312∗∗∗ 0.036 0.095 -0.024 0.072 0.050 0.056 0.480∗∗∗ 0.157
total gross inc. x kids 3-6 -0.149∗ 0.003 -0.016 -0.038 0.127∗∗∗ -0.040 0.092∗∗ 0.178∗∗∗ 0.031 0.020 -0.024 -0.096∗
total gross inc. x kids 7-16 -0.029 -0.001 0.015 0.038∗ 0.045∗∗∗ 0.026 0.026 0.048∗∗ 0.098∗∗∗ 0.045∗∗ 0.049∗ 0.055∗
total gross inc. x kids 17-25 0.091∗∗ 0.241∗∗∗ 0.202∗∗∗ 0.137∗∗∗ 0.201∗∗∗ 0.235∗∗∗ 0.181∗∗∗ 0.163∗∗∗ 0.242∗∗∗ 0.138∗∗∗ 0.136∗∗∗ 0.136∗∗∗
total gross inc.2/100 x married -0.003∗∗∗ -0.002∗∗ -0.001 -0.002∗ -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.001∗∗ 0.000 -0.001∗ 0.000 0.000
total gross inc.2/100 x kids 0-2 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 -0.005∗∗ -0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 -0.004∗∗∗ 0.000
total gross inc.2/100 x kids 3-6 0.003∗∗∗ 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001∗∗∗ 0.000 -0.001∗∗ -0.002∗∗ 0.001 -0.000 0.001 0.001∗∗
total gross inc.2/100 x kids 7-16 0.001 0.000 -0.000 -0.001∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000 0.000 -0.001∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗ -0.000 -0.000 -0.001∗∗∗
total gross inc.2/100 x kids 17-25 0.000 -0.002∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗
total gross inc.3/1000 x married 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗ 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000∗ 0.000 -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000 0.000∗ -0.000 -0.000
total gross inc.3/1000 x kids 0-2 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000∗ 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000∗∗ -0.000 0.000 -0.000
total gross inc.3/1000 x kids 3-6 -0.000∗∗ -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000∗∗∗ -0.000 0.000∗ 0.000 -0.000∗∗ 0.000 -0.000 -0.000∗∗
total gross inc.3/1000 x kids 7-16 -0.000∗ -0.000 0.000∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000 -0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000 0.000 0.000∗∗∗
total gross inc.3/1000 x kids 17-25 -0.000 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000 0.000∗ 0.000∗
labor inc. (male) 0.044 0.211∗ 0.193∗∗∗ 0.136∗∗ 0.189∗∗∗ 0.071 0.102 0.117∗∗ 0.207∗∗∗ 0.208∗∗∗ 0.108∗ 0.088
labor inc. (female) 0.126 0.366∗∗∗ 0.159 0.100 0.123∗ 0.032 0.116 0.111∗ 0.214∗∗∗ -0.005 0.118 0.043
labor inc. (male)2/100 0.002 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000 -0.000 -0.001∗∗∗ 0.000 0.001
labor inc. (male)3/1000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000∗ -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000∗∗∗ -0.000 -0.000
labor inc. (female)2/100 0.002 -0.003 -0.000 0.003 0.001 0.002 -0.000 0.002∗ -0.000 0.006∗∗ 0.001 0.004
labor inc. (female)3/1000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000∗ -0.000 -0.000∗∗ -0.000 -0.000
labor inc. (male) x married -0.173 -0.176∗ -0.060 -0.168∗∗∗ 0.011 0.019 0.058 0.038 0.022 -0.077∗ 0.046 -0.065
labor inc. (male) x kids 0-2 0.064 0.211∗ 0.048 -0.181∗∗ 0.030 0.017 0.089 -0.000 0.031 -0.002 -0.504∗∗∗ -0.018
labor inc. (male) x kids 3-6 0.141∗ 0.040 0.044 0.115∗∗∗ -0.063∗ 0.103∗∗∗ -0.028 -0.120∗∗ 0.016 0.032 0.070 0.173∗∗∗
labor inc. (male) x kids 7-16 0.064∗ 0.062∗ 0.038∗∗∗ 0.028 0.008 0.033 0.024 0.022 -0.043∗∗ -0.001 0.018 0.018
labor inc. (male) x kids 17-25 -0.026 -0.171∗∗∗ -0.096∗∗∗ 0.003 -0.125∗∗∗ -0.161∗∗∗ -0.090∗∗∗ -0.046∗ -0.146∗∗∗ -0.079∗∗∗ -0.067∗∗∗ -0.032
labor inc. (female) x married -0.029 -0.302∗∗ -0.053 -0.004 0.029 0.137∗ 0.055 0.047 0.072 0.137 0.037 0.064
labor inc. (female) x kids 0-2 0.034 0.154 -0.118 -0.046 0.106 0.089 -0.011 0.047 0.052 -0.364∗ -0.222∗ 0.037
labor inc. (female) x kids 3-6 0.012 -0.018 0.027 0.022 0.058∗ -0.035 -0.034 0.026 -0.077 0.043 0.070 0.013
labor inc. (female) x kids 7-16 0.022 0.062∗ 0.033∗ -0.001 0.002 0.003 -0.009 0.009 -0.004 0.039 -0.020 -0.005
labor inc. (female) x kids 17-25 -0.064 -0.058 -0.105∗∗∗ -0.060∗ -0.095∗∗∗ -0.118∗∗∗ -0.066∗∗ -0.099∗∗∗ -0.217∗∗∗ -0.069∗ -0.068∗∗ -0.061∗
labor inc. (male)2/100 x married 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002∗∗∗ 0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 0.001∗∗∗ -0.001 0.000
labor inc. (male)2/100 x kids 0-2 0.001 -0.001 -0.000 0.002∗∗∗ 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.008∗∗∗ -0.000
labor inc. (male)2/100 x kids 3-6 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗ 0.002∗∗∗ -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.002∗∗∗
labor inc. (male)2/100 x kids 7-16 -0.001 -0.001∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000 -0.000 -0.000∗ -0.000∗ -0.000 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000 -0.000 0.000
labor inc. (male)2/100 x kids 17-25 -0.000 0.002∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗ -0.001∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000 0.001∗∗∗ 0.000∗ 0.000∗ -0.000
labor inc. (male)3/1000 x married -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000∗∗∗ 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000∗ 0.000 -0.000∗∗∗ 0.000 -0.000
labor inc. (male)3/1000 x kids 0-2 -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000∗∗∗ 0.000
labor inc. (male)3/1000 x kids 3-6 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗ 0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗ -0.000∗∗ 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000∗∗∗
labor inc. (male)3/1000 x kids 7-16 0.000 0.000∗∗ 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ -0.000 -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000 0.000 -0.000
labor inc. (male)3/1000 x kids 17-25 0.000 -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗ -0.000 -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000 -0.000 0.000∗∗
labor inc. (female)2/100 x married -0.001 0.005∗∗ 0.001 -0.003 -0.001 -0.002 0.000 -0.002 -0.001 -0.005∗ -0.001 -0.004
labor inc. (female)2/100 x kids 0-2 0.001 -0.002 0.008 0.002 -0.002 -0.004∗ -0.000 -0.002 -0.001 0.027 0.002 -0.001
labor inc. (female)2/100 x kids 3-6 0.001 0.000 -0.000 0.001 -0.001 0.004∗ 0.002∗ -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.002 0.000
labor inc. (female)2/100 x kids 7-16 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.000
labor inc. (female)2/100 x kids 17-25 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001∗ 0.000 0.001∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.001 0.001 0.001
labor inc. (female)3/1000 x married 0.000 -0.000∗ -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000∗ 0.000 0.000
labor inc. (female)3/1000 x kids 0-2 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000∗∗ 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000
labor inc. (female)3/1000 x kids 3-6 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000∗ 0.000 -0.000∗∗ -0.000∗∗ 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000
labor inc. (female)3/1000 x kids 7-16 0.000 0.000 0.000∗ -0.000∗ -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000
labor inc. (female)3/1000 x kids 17-25 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000∗ -0.000 -0.000∗ -0.000∗∗ -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
asset inc. 0.150 0.396 0.886∗∗∗ 0.655∗∗∗ 0.612∗∗∗ 0.480∗∗∗ 0.537∗∗∗ 0.817∗∗∗ 0.459∗∗ 0.696∗∗∗ 0.490∗∗ 0.616∗∗
asset inc.2/100 0.016 -0.009 -0.026 -0.018∗ -0.009 -0.002 -0.001 -0.007∗ 0.001 -0.016∗∗∗ -0.011 -0.012
asset inc.3/1000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000∗ 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000 0.000
asset inc. x married 0.331 0.387 -0.142 0.098 -0.083 -0.076 0.041 -0.112 0.328∗ -0.101 0.347∗ 0.297
asset inc. x kids 0-2 -0.096 0.125 0.012 0.104 0.717∗∗∗ 0.433∗ -0.031 -0.003 0.115 0.848∗ 1.565∗∗∗ -0.420
asset inc. x kids 3-6 0.258 -0.029 0.086 -0.107 -0.029 0.247∗ 0.098 0.316 0.030 0.099 -0.245 -0.044
asset inc. x kids 7-16 0.032 -0.048 -0.078∗ -0.149∗∗ -0.088 0.086∗ 0.029 -0.100∗ -0.055 -0.054 -0.341∗∗∗ -0.259∗∗
asset inc. x kids 17-25 0.235∗∗ 0.148 -0.224∗∗∗ -0.199∗∗∗ 0.003 0.027 0.127∗∗∗ 0.019 -0.236∗∗∗ -0.132∗∗∗ -0.147 -0.451∗∗∗
asset inc.2/100 x married -0.019 -0.001 0.015 0.006 0.006 0.002 -0.001 0.001 -0.006 0.013∗∗∗ -0.006 -0.010
asset inc.2/100 x kids 0-2 0.031 -0.000 0.010 -0.034 -0.046∗∗∗ -0.022∗ -0.005 -0.010 -0.017 -0.163∗∗ -0.139∗∗∗ 0.012
asset inc.2/100 x kids 3-6 -0.040 -0.005 -0.020 0.001 0.001 -0.008∗ -0.001 -0.017 -0.012 -0.014∗ 0.008 -0.008
asset inc.2/100 x kids 7-16 -0.003 -0.004 0.001 0.002 0.001 -0.005∗∗ -0.004∗∗ 0.002 -0.002 -0.003 0.013∗∗∗ 0.012∗
asset inc.2/100 x kids 17-25 -0.015∗∗∗ -0.015∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ -0.002 -0.001∗ -0.003∗∗∗ -0.001 0.003∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.008∗ 0.017∗∗∗
asset inc.3/1000 x married 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000∗∗ 0.000 0.000 -0.000∗∗∗ 0.000 0.000
asset inc.3/1000 x kids 0-2 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000∗∗ 0.000∗ 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001∗∗ 0.000∗ 0.000
asset inc.3/1000 x kids 3-6 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000∗∗ -0.000 0.000
asset inc.3/1000 x kids 7-16 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000∗ 0.000∗∗ -0.000 0.000∗ 0.000∗ -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗
asset inc.3/1000 x kids 17-25 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ 0.000 0.000 0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗ -0.000∗∗
o.asset inc.3/1000 0.000
o.asset inc.3/1000 x married 0.000
Constant 1438.193∗∗∗ 1410.244∗∗∗ 1321.302∗∗∗ 1271.541∗∗∗ 1269.759∗∗∗ 1301.663∗∗∗ 1257.600∗∗∗ 1240.465∗∗∗ 1353.466∗∗∗ 1244.229∗∗∗ 1122.995∗∗∗ 1297.217∗∗∗
R2 0.950 0.953 0.956 0.961 0.961 0.981 0.985 0.978 0.972 0.978 0.975 0.966
Observations 2194 2068 3513 3251 3518 3360 3150 2908 2995 2716 2442 2189
Note: This table shows results of the tax benefit regression described in equation (8) for each year separately. The dependent
variable is household disposable income. Significance levels are indicated as follows: ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
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